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THE HEARSAY RULE IN FEDERAL
CRIINAL CASES--PART ONEt
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
I 1898 Professor Thayer of the Harvard Law School concluded:
"There is a great head of the law of evidence, comprising, indeed, with
its exceptions, much the largest part of all that truly belongs there,
forbidding the introduction of hearsay."' A professor at the University of
London has pointed out that "nearly one-third of the law of evidence
is concerned with the complications arising from the admission of
hearsay."2 Professor McCormick in his Handbook of the Law of Evidence
devotes 180 pages out of 712 pages to the subject. Wigmore devotes about
1400 pages to the subject.
Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the Supreme Court, has stated that the
chief grounds of the exclusion of hearsay evidence "are, that the reported
declaration (if in fact made) is made without the sanction of an oath,
with no responsibility on the part of the declarant for error or falsifica-
tion, without opportunity for the court, jury, or parties to observe the
demeanor and temperament of the witness, and to search his motives and
test his accuracy and veracity by cross-examination, these being most im-
portant safeguards of the truth, where a witness testifies in person, and as
of his own knowledge .... " Mr. Justice Field had earlier stated: "The
testimony of living witnesses personally cognizant of the facts of which
they speak, given under the sanction of an oath in open court, where they
may be subjected to cross-examination, affords the greatest security for
truth."
t Part Two of this article will appear in the May issue of this volume.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 518 (1898).
On hearsay in general, see 2 Jones, Evidence §§ 268-333 (5th ed. 1958) (hereinafter cited
as Jones); McCormick, Evidence 455-634 (1954) (hereinafter cited as McCormick);
2 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 211-326 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Morgan);
Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 106-95
(1956); 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence 569-765 (19th ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as
Wharton); 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 266-67, 276, 278, 291 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited
Wigmore); 3 id. §§ 734-55; 4 id. §§ 1048-87; 5 id. §§ 1361-684; 6 id. §§ 1690-810;
9 id. §§ 2550, 2594(a); Symposium-Hearsay Evidence, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 207 (1961).
2. Nokes, The English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 153, 167
(1956).
3. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913). See McCormick § 224;
5 Wigmore § 1362.
4. Chaffee & Co. v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 516, 541 (1873).
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Mr. Justice Harlan has stated that hearsay evidence " 'denotes that
kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit to
be given to the witness himself, but rests, also, in part, on the veracity
and competency of some other person.' "I Hearsay evidence is not admis-
sible in civil cases and a fortiori not in criminal. It is incompetent to
establish any specific fact in its nature susceptible of being proved by
witnesses who speak from their own knowledge. It may not be used to
establish the identity of the victim of murder.
Professor McCormick has offered the following brief definition of hear-
say: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value
upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."0 A federal district court
has taken a similar view.7
Several judicial decisions describe evidence as hearsay, where in fact
the objection is that the witness lacks first hand knowledge.8 For ex-
ample, a federal court has held that conclusions of immigration inspectors
based on reports of testimony as to a person's citizenship are hearsay.'
A few concrete, typical examples of rejection of evidence as hearsay
may be helpful to indicate the scope of the hearsay rule. The testimony
offered by the defendant that a third person has confessed to the crime is
inadmissible as hearsay.' ° In one case the court considered such evidence,
but on the facts denied a new trial."
The arresting officer may explain his going to the scene of the crime
or his interview with the defendant, or a search and seizure by stating that
he did so upon information received.' 2 But if the officer becomes more
specific by repeating definite complaints of a particular offense by the
defendant, this is so likely to be used improperly by the jury as evidence
of the fact asserted that it should be excluded as hearsay.'8 The error
5. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 581 (1884). The Court quoted I Greenleaf § 99
(1886), and 1 S. Phillipps, Evidence 169 (2d ed. 1820). See also 5 Wigmore § 1361; 6 Id.
§ 1766.
6. McCormick § 225. See generally Wheaton, What is Hearsay? 46 Iowa L. Rev.
210 (1961).
7. United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 813-14 (E.D. Pa. 1945). The court
cited 6 Wigmore § 1766. See also Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cr.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962), citing McCormick §§ 227-28.
8. See McCormick § 226; 2 Wigmore § 657; 5 id. §§ 1361, 1363(3), at 9.
9. Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 840 (8th Cir. 1943).
10. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) ; Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225,
226 (9th Cir. 1954).
11. United States v. Lawrenson, 192 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Md. 1961).
12. McCprmick § 227, at 463.
13. Smith v. United States, 105 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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may be cured by cautioning the jury not to consider the statement as af-
fecting the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In a prosecution for rob-
bery of a filling station, the police officer's testimony that the robber on
approaching an automobile had said, "Wait, don't leave me," was not
hearsay, but admissible as an oral part of the robber's act of running
toward a standing automobile and as tending to explain the robber's act
as his return to a waiting confederate, disclosed to be the defendant by
his confession.' 4
It seems helpful also to consider some utterances to which the hearsay
rule does not apply.' Evidence of conversations between conspirators
in the absence of the defendant as to statements by one of the defendants,
made as an inducement to go on with the conspiracy, is competent against
the defendant and is not hearsay.' 6 Proof that a certain statement was
made is not hearsay of that fact, but is hearsay of the truth of the state-
ment.'
7
Testimony of third persons who were present and heard an oral contract
made is not hearsay, but competent to prove the contract and its terms. 8
The testimony was held to be direct evidence of the existence of the con-
tract. It was incorrect to say that only the parties to the contract could
testify.
Sometimes a statement is received as circumstantial evidence of an
operative fact. On a prosecution for the murder of an F.B.I. agent who
was engaged in the performance of his duty, an indictment of the de-
fendant for bank robbery was admissible as evidence that the murder
victim, killed while waiting to arrest the defendant, was acting in the
performance of duty. 9
Evidence of words used in the presence of a person is sometimes re-
ceived as tending to prove such person's state of mind or emotion. State-
ments made to a defendant in a fraud prosecution were admitted to show
his belief in the efficacy of his product. -0 On a prosecution for conspiracy
14. George v. United States, 125 F.2d 559, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1942), citing 6 Wigmore
§§ 1772-75. See also Ward v. United States, 296 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1961), citing
6 Wigmore §§ 1766-78; United States v. Sapperstein, 198 F. Supp. 147, 150 (D. Md.
1961), aff'd, 312 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1963). The lower court cited McCormick § 227, at 463.
15. 6 Wignore § 1770; McCormick § 228.
16. Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 271 U.S.
673 (1926).
17. See Enlow v. United States, 239 F.2d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1957); Harvey v. United
States, 23 F.2d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 1928).
18. Prosser v. United States, 265 Fed. 252, 253-54 (8th Cir. 1920), citing 1 Wigrnore
§ 657. See also Paddock v. United States, 79 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1935).
19. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 US. 963 (1954).
20. Frank v. United States, 220 F.2d 559, 563-64 (10th Cir. 1955), citing 6 Wigmore
§ 1789.
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to overthrow the Government in violation of the Smith Act, declarations
by the defendant made prior to indictment were held admissible to show
intent.2 But a defendant may not introduce evidence of a discussion he
had with a third person when no offer was made by his counsel to in-
troduce such discussion to show the good faith of the defendant, who was
charged with using the mails to defraud. 2
In a narcotics prosecution in which the defendant pleaded entrapment,
the Government was allowed to show information the officers had re-
ceived that the defendant was already engaged in the narcotics traffic
before they enticed him to sell heroin to them. 8 Here the utterance or
writing is offered to show the effect on the hearer or reader.2
On a prosecution for extortion, the victim's state of mind may be evi-
denced by his own testimony at the trial, or pursuant to an exception to
the hearsay rule, by statements made by him to others. 5
In one case, testimony of the postmaster of X that he had no knowledge
of A, an insured in a life policy whose residence was given as X, and evi-
dence that his name was not in the city directory of X, were received
as tending to prove that A was fictitious.2 6 Prosecution was for using the
mails to defraud. An objection of hearsay will not be sustained. Fruitless
inquiries are evidence of inability of the inquirer to find after a diligent
search; and this in turn is circumstantial evidence of the nonexistence of
the person in question. It would be difficult to prove nonexistence in any
other way. A denial of knowledge is not a statement of opinion.
Sometimes conduct may be hearsay. 8 Thus, in a prosecution for trans-
porting girls for immoral purposes in interstate commerce, evidence that
during the investigation the girls had identified the cabin where they
stayed was hearsay and incompetent. 9 In a prosecution for conspiracy to
violate the prohibition laws, evidence as to tolls charged to defendant's
telephone is admissible against the defendant, from whose telephone the
calls were made, over the objections that the evidence was hearsay and
21. United States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449, 453-54 (3d Cir. 1955). See 6 Wlgmore
§ 1790. See also United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694, 697-98 (4th Cir. 1963),
citing McCormick § 228; 6 Wigmore § 1789.
22. Roberson v. United States, 284 Fed. 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1922).
23. Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900
(1954). Defendant did not object at the trial. See also Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d
328, 332 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962).
24. McCormick § 228, at 464-65; 6 Wigmore § 1790.
25. United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1961), citing 6 Wigmore § 1730.
26. Nichols v. United States, 48 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir. 1931).
27. McCormick § 228, at 469; 5 Wigmore § 1414(2), at 190; 46 Harv. L. Rev. 715
(1933) ; 24 N.C.L. Rev. 274, 278 (1946).
28. McCormick § 229, at 471; 2 Wigmore § 267.
29. Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612, 621 (8th Cir. 1943).
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the caller was unidentified. 30 Payment by the defendant of the tolls
charged to their phones tended to establish the identity of the caller in
the absence of explanatory evidence. There are cases in which testimony
by police officers is admitted that, after seizing an alleged gaming house,
they heard on the telephone the incoming calls of customers trying to
place bets, as evidence of the character of the place.3
In a mail fraud prosecution the court may refuse to admit in evidence,
under an exception to the hearsay rule, declarations made by two persons
during the course of bankruptcy proceedings, where the issues were far
different from those in the criminal proceeding, and the United States was
only a claimant in the bankruptcy proceeding, and there was no showing
of occasion to cross-examine the persons in question."
Hearsay evidence can have the effect of violating the right of the de-
fendant to confront the witnesses against him.33 In such case its admis-
sion against objection may constitute error. But the Supreme Court later
held that the admission of evidence, otherwise hearsay, but admissible at
common law because of its relation to the defendant through his own
acts and conduct, does not violate the guaranty. 4 The evidence admitted
consisted of letters, bank deposit slips, and book entries. The constitu-
tional provision was not intended to broaden the common-law right of
confrontation.
Hearsay evidence, when not objected to, has been admitted and given
its natural probative effect even in a murder case.3" The right to con-
frontation may be waived.36 For example, there may be waiver by con-
sent to the admission of transcribed testimony where, after mistrial be-
cause of illness of a juror, the trial goes on before the remaining eleven
30. Dolff v. United States, 61 F.2d 881, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
763 (1933). See also Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837, 841 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 298
U.S. 655 (1936).
31. Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1950), 29 Texas L. Rev.
962 (1951); Falknor, Evidence, 1951 Ann. Survey Am. L. 835, 854-55 (1952). See also
Reynolds v. United States, 225 F.2d 123, 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 914 (1955).
32. Bailey v. United States, 282 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 US.
828 (1961). The court cited 5 Wigmore § 1386.
33. Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 450 (1912). See McCormick § 231; 5 Wigmore §§ 1365, 1395-1400; Orfield, Depositions
in Federal Criminal Procedure, 9 S.C.L.Q. 376, 392-98 (1957); 2 Ala. L. Rev. 93 (1949).
34. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 547-48 (1926).
35. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912). See Bechrx v. United States.
5 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925); Foster v. United States, 178
Fed. 165, 176 (6th Cir. 1910). See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
331, 350-52 (1961).
36. Diaz v. United States, supra note 35; Kemp v. Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938, 940
(5th Cir. 1948).
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and a substituted juror. 7 Even in a treason case there will be no reversal
merely because some purely irrelevant hearsay testimony was admitted. 8
Failure to object immediately after a hearsay answer was given to a
proper question was not a waiver where after a few more questions the
defendant renewed his objection previously made to the question, and
in a prior side-bar discussion defendant's counsel informed the court that
answer to the question would be objectionable as hearsay."0
The admission of hearsay where the testimony is unimportant and
neither adds to nor detracts from the well supported conclusion of guilt
is not reversible error whether objected to or not.40 If evidence to the
same effect as the hearsay is introduced-as for example testimony by
the defendant-there is not prejudicial error.41 The defendant cannot
object on appeal when he himself secured the introduction of the evi-
dence.42 Where counsel for the defendant asks a witness what a third
person said he has invited hearsay and cannot move to strike out the
answer which turns out to be unfavorable.48
In 1813 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall took a very critical attitude towards
hearsay. He stated: "Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy
the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be prac-
tised under its cover, combine to support the rule, that hearsay evidence
is totally inadmissible.1 44 The implication would seem to be that even if
not objected to, it has no probative value. But the modern view is over-
whelmingly contrary.45 In 1952 Judge Jerome Frank stated broadly of
the rule that hearsay admitted without objection is to be considered and
accorded its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible: "The
federal authorities are unanimous on this point. '40 On review by the
court of appeals such hearsay will not be disregarded.4 7 But the court of
37. Grove v. United States, 3 F.2d 965, 966 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 691 (1925).
38. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781
(1943). Compare Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1936).
39. United States v. Companaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1945), citing 1 Wigmore
§ 18.
40. Lypp v. United States, 159 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1947).
41. Williams v. United States, 265 F.2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 1959). See also United
States v. Finazzo, 288 F.2d 175, 177 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
42. Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 930
(1962).
43. Parilla v. United States, 280 Fed. 761, 765 (6th Cir. 1922).
44. Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 296 (1813).
45. Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1130 (1936).
46. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952). See also Byars v. United States, 238 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1956); Petro v. United
States, 210 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
47. Metcalf v. United States, 195 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1952).
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appeals will reverse if there was plain error affecting substantial rights
of the defendant.48
Judge Browning has pointed out that Rule 43 (c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allows the district court to admit hearsay evidence
if satisfied that reasonable standards of necessity and trustworthiness
are met.49 Since Rule 26 provides more liberal standards for admission
of evidence, the same should be true in criminal cases. But the courts
should proceed with caution in whittling down the hearsay rule in criminal
cases. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated: "The
'hearsay' rule is often grossly artificial. Again in a different context it
may be the very essence of justice, keeping out gossip, rumor, unfounded
report, second, third, or further hand stories.""0
Admission against the defendant of hearsay testimony of a government
agent concerning conversations with an informer is not excusable on the
ground that it was merely cumulative of the informer's later testimony
when the Government refused to vouch for the credibility of the informer
and made it clear that no reliance was to be placed on the testimony of
the informer.51 Where the only evidence of the defendant's guilt was
hearsay, the court of appeals will consider the error in admission, even
though it was not objected to, as plain error under Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. -
II. TESTimONY TAKEN AT A FORMiEER HEARING
An examination of a defendant, made before his commitment, under
impressions of fear, whether signed by him or not, cannot be read in
evidence at the trial on an indictment for murder on the high seas. 3 The
defendant was a French sailor who did not know the English language.
He was not informed that he was then under examination and not on his
trial. Apparently he thought he was under trial. Circuit Justice Paterson
48. Glenn v. United States, 271 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1959) (citing many cases).
49. La Porte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878, 882 n.20 (9th Cir. 1962).
50. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946).
51. Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260, 265 (8th Cir. 1961). See also United States
v. Ploof, 311 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1963).
52. United States v. Dunn, 299 F.2d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 1962).
53. United States v. Maunier, 26 Fed. Cas. 1210 (No. 15746) (C.C.D.N.C. 1792).
The defendant was subsequently found guilty upon other evidence. This is the earliest case
on evidence in federal criminal cases discovered by the author of this article.
On testimony taken at a former hearing see 2 Jones §§ 308-15; McCormick §§ 230-38;
2 Morgan 222-29; 2 Wharton 265-312; S Wigmore §§ 1364, 1370-71, 1373-76, 1386-89,
1402-16, 1660-69; 7 id. §§ 2098, 2099, 2103; 9 id. § 2550; 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence
1076-93 (5th ed. 1956) (hereinafter cited as Underhill); Falknor, Former Testimony and
the Uniform Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651 (1963); Note, 46 Ioa L. Rev. 356
(1961).
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thought that the examination should have been signed by the defendant.
District Judge Sitgreaves thought that the element of fear had much
weight. Counsel for the defendant argued that while the testimony of
other witnesses could be used at the trial, that of the defendant could not
be used unless he signed. He cited only English precedents, and the two
judges cited no precedents at all.
Another early case held against the use of the defendant's testimony
given at the preliminary examination. 4 The Government produced the
magistrate to prove that the two defendants charged with stealing a cable
had testified before him, to show that they had made opposite and incon-
sistent statements, and to show their confession upon oath before the
magistrate. The trial court refused to admit the testimony. Where the
magistrate before whom the prisoner was brought, told him that there was
evidence enough to commit him at all events, and therefore he had better
confess the whole truth, and that he would probably fare the better for
it, a confession thereby obtained would not be admitted at the trial."
What was said in the presence of the defendant before the examining
magistrate, and to which he made no reply, may not be used at the trial.5
The defendant had a right to remain silent. But the same court held that
statements of the defendant at the preliminary examination or just before
it could be used."
A confession made at the preliminary examination after a caution
against self-incrimination cannot be used where forty-two hours before,
he had made a confession to one of the magistrate's officers under im-
proper promises. 8
A court has stated that the admissibility of former testimony in a pro-
ceeding at which the defendant was present and could cross-examine is a
"well established exception to the rule which excludes hearsay, if, indeed,
we may not in one sense, regard it as original testimony. We receive it
because it comes up to one of the demands of the law; it is the best evi-
dence which can be produced." 59
54. United States v. Duffy, 25 Fed. Cas. 922 (No. 14998) (C.C.D.C. 1804).
55. United States v. Charles, 25 Fed. Cas. 409 (No. 14786) (C.C.D.C. 1813). See also
United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 629, 630 (No. 14864) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1857); United
States v. Pocklington, 27 Fed. Cas. 580 (No. 16060) (C.C.D.C. 1822).
56. United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1247 (No. 14660) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
57. United States v. Larkin, 26 Fed. Cas. 866 (No. 15561) (C.C.D.C. 1835); United
States v. Kurtz, 26 Fed. Cas. 826 (No. 15547) (C.C.D.C. 1836).
58. United States v. Chapman, 25 Fed. Cas. 404,406 (No. 14783) (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1851).
59. United States v. Macomb, 26 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1134 (No. 15702) (C.C.D. Ill. 1851).
Wigmore concludes that former testimony and depositions are not hearsay if there Is an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. 5 Wigmore § 1370. But writers and courts
classify it as hearsay. McCormick § 230.
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In 1896 the Supreme Court held that a statement of the defendant not
under oath before the magistrate was admissible; but if under oath it was
not admissible."0 It made no difference that the defendant was not warned
that his statement might be used against him and that he need not answer.
The Court followed this view in a 1912 decision."
Evidence that the defendant asked a witness at the preliminary hearing
how the witness knew it was the defendant when he had a handkerchief
over his face was properly admitted at a robbery trial as an admission."
On a second trial after the granting of a motion for new trial, evidence
of conviction on the first trial cannot be offered by the Government.'
A defendant charged with homicide has been permitted to introduce
evidence offered at his trial for assault and battery. He cannot then claim
that the evidence was hearsay and violated his right to confrontation, as
he has waived the privilege.6
Testimony given at a former trial cannot be received when the witness
is available. 5 This is even clearer where a different proceeding was in-
volved and the parties and issues were different.
What a witness, since dead, swore at the former trial on an indictment,
may be proved by a person who was present and heard his testimony if
he can repeat the testimony as the witness gave it, and not merely what
he conceives to be the substance of it.6 He may refresh his memory from
notes taken at the time; or from a newspaper printed by him containing
the evidence as taken down by him. But a more liberal rule has been
followed in subsequent cases.17 Logically, absence from the jurisdiction
should be treated like death of the witness."'
What a witness, since deceased, testified at the preliminary examina-
60. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896).
61. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313 (1912). See United States v. Block,
88 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 690 (1937); Cooper v. United States,
5 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1925).
62. Nance v. United States, 299 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Fahy, J., dissenting).
63. Ogden v. United States, 112 Fed. 523, 526 (3d Cir. 1902).
64. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912).
65. Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1958), citing McCormick
§§ 230-34.
66. United States v. Wood, 28 Fed. Cas. 754 (No. 16756) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818). The
witness was rejected. But testimony at a former trial was rejected in United States v.
Sterland, 27 Fed. Cas. 1307, 1308 (No. 16387) (D.C.W.D. Va. 1858).
67. United States v. White, 28 Fed. Cas. 572, 573 (No. 16679) (C.C.D.C. 1838). See
United States v. Macomb, 26 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1135 (No. 15702) (C.C.D. IMI. 1851). This
case involved testimony given at a preliminary examination in which the evidence was
not reduced to writing. The witness was dead. See also United States v. Penn, 27 Fed. Cas.
490, 491 (No. 16025) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1876).
68. United States v. Sterland, 27 Fed. Cas. 1307, 1308 (No. 16387) (D.C.W.D. Va. 1858).
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tion may be used at the trial." The defendant had been present and his
counsel had cross-examined the witness. The rules of evidence in criminal
and civil cases are alike on this point. It is sufficient to prove substantially
all that the deceased witnesses testified upon the particular subject of
inquiry. The precise words need not be repeated. The law did not require
that the preliminary examination be reduced to writing, but it was fre-
quently done, and it ought to be done. The Supreme Court upheld this
view.7° Where the testimony is reduced to writing in a narrative form
and signed by the witness, it may be read to the jury, instead of being
used merely to refresh the recollection of the witness identifying it,7 1
Where a witness at a proceeding before the United States commissioner
for removal to another district thereafter dies, her testimony may be used
at a subsequent trial.
72
Finally in 1895 there was a decision by the Supreme Court upholding
the use of testimony of deceased witnesses given at a prior trial. 3 In a
murder case the Government was allowed to use the testimony of two
deceased witnesses, there being a properly verified copy of the reporter's
stenographic notes. There was no violation of the right to confront the
witnesses. This rule has been applied where there is a second trial under
a new indictment, the first indictment having been held defective.74
Where a witness who testified at the preliminary examination of the
defendant upon the same charge is living, but has gone out of the juris-
diction of the court, his testimony may not be used at the trial.7" The
defendant cannot insist on the use of his testimony. The Government as
well as the defendant has the right to confrontation of witnesses. In
1948 a court held that the defendant, by failure to object, may waive the
69. United States v. Macomb, 26 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1133 (No. 15702) (C.C.E.D. Ill. 1851).
See also United States v. Penn, 27 Fed. Cas. 490, 491 (No. 16025) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1876).
70. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)
71. Baldwin v. United States, 5 F.2d 133 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 552
(1925).
72. United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 796, 801 (S.D. Ga. 1906), citing 2 Wigmore, Evi-
dence §§ 1397, 3905 (1st ed. 1904).
73. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). But the Court excluded evidence of
the defendant that after the first trial the witness said that his testimony was untrue and
secured by duress. See criticism, 28 N.C.L. Rev. 205, 206 n.12 (1950).
"It is the established rule in federal courts that testimony given in a former criminal
trial is admissible in a retrial of that cause when the witness has become unavailable."
Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
946 (1963).
74. Shaw v. United States, 1 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1924), 23 Mich. L. Rev. 408
(1925).
75. United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 34, 41-43 (C.C.D.N.H. 1881).
(Vol. 32
use of a statement made by witnesses absent at the trial but present at
the preliminary examination."0
The confrontation provision is violated by admitting in evidence the
statement of an absent witness taken at the preliminary examination of
the defendant where the absence of the witness was not by the procure-
ment, connivance or suggestion of the defendant, but due to the negli-
gence of the Government." But where the Government is not negligent
a decision of the Supreme Court in a state court proceeding would allow
use of the testimony. ' Temporary absence of a witness beyond the district
wrongfully procured by the defendant is sufficient ground for admitting
his testimony of a former trial. '9 There is no violation of the confronta-
tion provision of the Constitution.
Permanent physical disability will excuse attendance at the trial and
permit use of testimony given by the witness at the preliminary examina-
tion. Temporary disability is not a ground, as a continuance may be
sought.80 This is the prevalent rule in state court cases, though in prin-
ciple it may be too strict.8 '
If the defendant exercises his privilege not to testify, his testimony
at a former trial may be used, as the requirement of unavailability is
satisfied . 2 If a defendant takes the stand at his first trial, then obtains
a reversal and is tried again, his entire testimony at the first trial may be
read to the jury by the Government either as admissions by the defendant
or under the reported-testimony exception to the hearsay rule. 3
The trial judge passes on the question of whether or not the witness
is dead as a preliminary question and he will be reversed only for manifest
error.8 4 The same is true as to disability of the witness.s The decision
76. Kemp v. Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1948).
77. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900).
78. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1904).
79. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting).
80. Smith v. United States, 106 F.2d 726, 728 (4th Cir. 1939).
81. McCormick § 234, at 493-94.
82. United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), citing
McCormick § 234, at 494, 5 Wigmore § 1409, at 163.
83. United States v. Yates, 107 F. Supp. 408, 411 (S.D. Cal. 1952). The court cited
Model Code of Evidence rule 511 (1942). See also Edmonds v. United States, 273 F.2d
108, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 977 (1960); Warde v. United States,
158 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.
1940) ; Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594, 597 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925);
United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d
1404 (1949).
84. Baldwin v. United States, 5 F.2d 133 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 US. 552 (1925).
See McCormick § 236; 2 Morgan 228-29.
85. Smith v. United States, 106 F.2d 726, 728 (4th Cir. 1939).
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lies in the discretion of the trial judge. It will not be reversed if rea-
sonably supported by the evidence, but only where it can be said to be
an abuse of discretion. The condition of the witness may be shown by a
physician's testimony.
An early case, while permitting a defendant to take a deposition, left
it uncertain whether it could be given in evidence at the trial.80 But if not
admitted it would be considered by the judge in imposing sentence. The
scope, force and effect of the deposition could be seen when the case came
on for trial. A year later another court seemed clearly to imply that the
deposition could be used at the trial. 7 After all, the Government could
cross-examine the person giving the deposition at the time it was given.
If the reputation for truth and veracity of the deponent was bad, the
Government could show this at the trial.
The Government may not take depositions; hence there is no question
of their use at the trial. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the
"primary object" of the confrontation provision of the Constitution "was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes ad-
mitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner ...."81 It was sub-
sequently held that the deposition of a witness since deceased, taken by
the Government on notice to the defendant, but without his consent or
presence or presence of his representative, is not admissible against the
defendant at the trial."0 A deposition of a defendant, taken in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding should not be used against a defendant without his
consent, but he should object at the time it is introduced."
A deposition may be used at the trial as to a co-defendant where a
physician's report indicates that he should not be subject to the excite-
ment attendant upon a trial.91 Rule 15(e) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure provides for such use if it appears "that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity."
The trial judge may exclude parts of a deposition having no probative
value in the case. 2 Hearsay, leading questions and personal remarks may
be excluded.
While an official stenographer's transcribed notes of the testimony at
86. United States v. Wilder, 14 Fed. 393 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1882). See 5 Wtgmore § 1398;
Orfield, Depositions in Federal Criminal Procedure, 9 S.C.L.Q. 376 (1957).
87. United States v. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794, 797 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1883).
88. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
89. United States v. French, 117 Fed. 976 (D. Ore. 1902).
90. Bain v. United States, 262 Fed. 664, 669 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 586 (1920).
Contra, 5 Wigmore § 1389, 1416.
91. United States v. Foster, 81 F. Supp. 281, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See Orlield, supra
note 86, at 407-08.
92. United States v. Schwartz, 213 F. Supp. 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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a former proceeding are admitted, 3 when properly authenticated, under
the hearsay exception for official written statements, there is no rule
of preference for such reports, and any observer, including the stenog-
rapher herself, may be called to prove the former testimony without even
producing the official transcript. 4 But this has been criticized by Judge
Prettyman in a dissenting opinion. 5 On principle, before the proponent
resorts to recollection testimony, he should produce for inspection by the
adversary and trial judge the transcript of the testimony, or show that
he has no transcript under his control."
Notes of a private stenographer are inadmissible in evidence as hear-
sayf 7 This admission may be harmless error when other evidence con-
clusively establishes the defendant's guilt. Where the stenographer is a
witness the notes may properly be used by him as an aid to memory.
Admissions made by the defendant to a grand jury may be used to
prove the Government's case in chief and not simply to impeach the
defendant.9 8 The reading before the trial jury of the grand jury testimony
of a government witness, when not for the purpose of impeachment, nor
within any hearsay exception, but under the pretext of refreshing the
witness' recollection, is reversible error. 9 The right of confrontation of
witnesses was violated. The admission of the record of the grand jury's
proceedings showing the defendant's testimony as to collateral matters is
reversible error.100 An unconcluded criminal prosecution such as the
ignoramus of a bill by a grand jury or a nolle prosequi cannot be given in
evidence.10 '
93. Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
943 (1958).
94. See Wattenmaker v. United States, 34 F.2d 741, 743 (3d Cir. 1929); Boitano v.
United States, 7 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1925); Brzezinski v. United States, 198 Fed.
65, 66 (2d Cir. 1912).
95. Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
912 (1949); 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 113 (1949); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 30 (1950). Proceedings
before a Senate subcommittee were involved, and the general counsel of the subcommittee
testified as to the contents. See 4 Wigmore § 1330(2), at 651-52.
96. McCormick § 237, at 499 n.11.
97. Sneierson v. United States, 264 Fed. 268, 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S.
490 (1920), citing Wigmore § 1669.
98. United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 542, 548 (M.D. Pa.), modified, 165 F.2d
42, 50 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 852 (1948).
99. Young v. United States, 214 F.2d 232, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1954), citing 3 Wigmore
§ 1018.
100., United States v. Sager, 49 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1931). Credibility was not in
issue at the time of admission.
101. Gaines v. Reff, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 575 (1851) (dissenting opinion by
Wayne, J.).
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III. AFFIDAVITS
In general, ex parte affidavits are not admissible. 02 An affidavit made
to obtain an attachment in an action against a bank is inadmissible as
evidence of the insolvency of the bank in a criminal case against third
parties, there being no proof that a judgment was ever obtained in the
action or that return of nulla bona was made by the sheriff. 10 Even if
such proof had been made, the court left open the issue of admissibility.
On a motion for a new trial, a district court held, with some hesitation,
that an affidavit made on a motion to suppress evidence was admissible to
show defendant's ownership of wine. 4
The use in a prosecution for rape and house breaking, but only for
impeachment purposes, of the affidavit which the defendant had made
under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to secure
a subpoena for a defense witness was proper and did not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination." 5
The admission of the affidavit of an enforcement officer is not prej-
udicial when he testified at the trial and opportunity was given for cross-
examination.'0 6
In a habeas corpus proceeding, if the prisoner does not object, affidavits
presented by the Government may be received in evidence. 0 7 The pro-
ceeding is civil and not criminal. There is no right of confrontation.
Objection to hearsay may be waived.
The defendant may explain his affidavit by showing his purpose in
making it.'08
IV. ADMISSIONS
The Supreme Court has stated: "Admissions, retold at a trial, are
much like hearsay, that is, statements not made at the pending trial.
102. United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
920 .(1958); Vendetti v. United States, 45 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1930). On affidavits see
6 Wigmore §§ 1709-10; Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 356, 372-74 (1961).
103. Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1908).
104. United States v. Lindsly, 7 F.2d 247, 255 (E.D. La. 1925), rev'd on other grounds,
12 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1926). But the case also held that an ordinary ex parte affidavit
contradicting testimony given by the witness in open court is not worthy of belief
on motion for new trial. 7 F.2d at 254. See also Vaught v. United States, 7 F.2d 370 (9th
Cir. 1925).
105. Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 867, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (one judge dissenting).
See also Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1894).
106. Harris v. United States, 10 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1926).
107. Burgess v. King, 130 F.2d 61, 762 (8th Cir. 1942). See Note, 58 Mich. L. Rev.
1218, 1225 (1960).
108. Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, 251 (8th Cir. 1909).
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They had neither the compulsion of the oath nor the test of cross-ex-
amination. They are competent as an admission against interest."10
In a prosecution for conspiracy it was held that it was competent to
prove a statement made by the defendant to the effect that he would
implicate another, as the statement was "against interest." ' Such a
statement may be proved without a previous denial by the defendant, as
impeachment is not involved.
Judge Albert B. Mars has stated:
To this hearsay rule there are of course exceptions as firmly fixed in the law of
evidence as the rule itself and there are situations to which the rule is inapplicable.
So the rule is satisfied in the case of an admission against interest, for it is obvious
that the party making the admission would not cross-examine himself. All he need do
is to take the stand on his own behalf and explain the admission, if he thinks it
advisable."'
The Ninth Circuit" 2 has followed this view, as has the District of Colum-
bia.113
One court has stated broadly: "A party's statements are always com-
petent evidence against him unless they fall within some special exclu-
sionary rule."" 4 Wigmore concludes that once in, admissions "have such
testimonial value as belongs to any testimonial assertion under the cir-
cumstances ...."I" Adopting this language a court has held that an
admission of the defendant is sufficient as corroboration of the testimony
of a government witness in a perjury prosecution." 16
An admission is received even though it was self-serving when made.17
The defendant's petition to suppress evidence secured in a search was
involved.
109. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90 (1954). The Court cited 4 Wigmore § 1048.
On admissions see 2 Jones §§ 334-97; McCormick §§ 239-52; 2 Morgan 229-45; 2 Wharton
144-75; 2 Wigmore §§ 276-79, 285-92; 4 id. §§ 1048-87; Hetland, Admissons in the
Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary? 46 Iowa L. Rev. 307 (1961); Morgan, Admissions
as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355 (1921).
110. Adamson v. United States, 184 Fed. 714, 715 (8th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220
U.S. 612 (1911).
111. Gambino v. United States, 108 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1939). See McCormick § 239.
112. Kamanosuke Yuge v. United States, 127 F.2d 683, 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 648 (1942).
113. Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1940), citing 4 Wigmore
§§ 1048-50.
114. Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 858, 873 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
860 (1948).
115. 4 Wigmore § 1048, at 5-6.
116. United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
899 (1961).
117. Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410, 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 654
(1932). See 2 Morgan 232 (1954).
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Two circuits have stated: "The extrajudicial statements of a party to
the action, civil or criminal, are binding upon him and substantive evi-
dence against him.""18
In a prosecution for uttering a check having a forged indorsement,
portions of transcripts of testimony given by the defendants in a prosecu-
tion for housebreaking and larceny may be received in evidence to prove
admissions by the defendants. The court stated:
When evidence is offered to prove an admission-unlike the situation when it is
offered secondary evidence to prove statements of dead or absent witnesses-there is no
requirement that opportunity should have been given for cross-examination and, con-
sequently, no requirement of identity of issues. Admissions have probative value not
because they have been subjected to cross-examination and therefore satisfy the
hearsay rule, but because they are statements by a party opponent, inconsistent with
his present position as expressed in his pleadings and testimony."19
Judge Learned Hand has stated:
It is well settled that, when the veracity of a witness is subject to challenge because
of motive to fabricate, it is competent to put in evidence statements made by him con-
sistent with what he says on the stand, made before the motive arose. The common
sense of such a rule has been too strong for the formal objection that the evidence is
hearsay, and indeed the objection is in substance not good anyway, since the witness
is by hypothesis there to be cross-examined. 20
'A confession is one species of admission.12' The author has dealt with
confessions in a separate article."z
Judge Fahy has stated that "admissions or confessions are admissible
against the party who made them despite the rule against hearsay evi-
dence . . . Whether because testimony of admissions and confessions
is not obnoxious to the rule or because it is admitted under an exception
to the rule is unimportant."' 24 Rule 63 (6) of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence treats confessions as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The admissions of a defendant, not amounting to a confession, may
118. Fogarty v. United States, 263 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919
(1959) ; Gonzales v. Landon, 215 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1954).
119. Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1940), citing 4 Wlgmore
§§ 1048(3), 1049, 1050.
120. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925), citing Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); 4 Wigmore § 1129.
121. 4 Wigmore § 1050.
122. Orfield, Confessions of Federal Criminal Defendants, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 219 (1963).
123. Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
124. Id. at 748 n.7, citing 4 Wigmore §§ 1048-50, and Morgan, Admissions as an Excep-
tion to the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.J. 355 (1921). See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84,
90 (1954) (involving corroboration rather than admissibility); Maguire, Evidence of Guilt
108-09 (1959); Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 388 (1961).
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be admitted, although they are not in writing or given in his words."
But the whole of a connected conversation on the subject must be given.'O
One court has stated: "Statements and declarations by an accused, from
which, in connection with other evidence of surrounding circumstances,
an inference of guilt may be drawn, if shown to have been made volun-
tarily ...are admissible against him as admissions . *... ,12 But the
proof thereof ought to show at least the substance of the statement, and
not merely a digest thereof; hence a summary prepared by a narcotics
agent was not admissible.' 2 '
An oral admission made by a juvenile while in police custody and be-
fore the juvenile court had waived its exclusive and original jurisdiction
is inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding.-'
With respect to mental capacity as applied to insane persons, the out-
of-court declarant need only possess such minimum capacity to observe,
remember, and narrate the facts as will enable him to give some aid to the
trier. 3° If it does not appear that this capacity was wanting, then the
insanity of the declarant would only affect the credibility of the declara-
tion. It was so held as to a confession.' 3' Intoxication, short of mania, will
not bar a confession. 3 2
The defendant's admissions as to the terms of a writing have been
received in evidence. 133 But there is considerable danger of inaccuracy or
untruth in the reporting of an oral admission.""
In an income tax prosecution a waiver of restrictions on assessment
and collection of a tax deficiency signed by the taxpayer is not admis-
sible.' 35 But it may be harmless error to admit it where trial is by the
court and the evidence against the defendant is strong.
125. United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cas. 699, 704 (No. 16730) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830). See
also United States v. Matthews, 26 Fed. Cas. 1205, 1206 (No. 15741b) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843);
United States v. Larkin, 26 Fed. Cas. 866 (No. 15561 (C.C.D.C. 1835).
126. United States v. Wilson, supra note 125, at 704.
127. O'Neill v. United States, 19 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1927). See McCormick § 113.
128. O'Neill v. United States, supra note 127, at 325.
129. H1arling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961), 46 Minn. L. Rev.
967 (1962).
130. McCormick § 240.
131. McAfee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 643
(1940).
132. Bell v. United States, 47 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1931). See Annot, 74 A.L.R. 1098
(1931).
133. Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 196 (1895), affirming, 60 Fed. 75, 77-78
(D. Ore. 1894).
134. See McCormick § 208, at 424; 4 Wigmore §§ 1054, 1255-56.
135. Clark v. United States, 211 F.2d 100, 105 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 US.
911 (1955).
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An admission of a defendant is not conclusive. He may be permitted
to explain it. 3 '
Satisfaction to the owners of the goods stolen is admissible against
the defendant; but if made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprison-
ment or of a trial, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evi-
dence against the defendant. 13 7
While in civil cases compromise negotiations are privileged, a federal
court has held that this is not true in criminal cases. 8' In this case the
defendant offered to plead guilty if he could settle the liquor violation
charge against him by paying a fine. The compromise effort was addressed
to the Government and not to a private victim of crime. But this ap-
proach makes criminal law administration difficult; hence most state
courts recognize such offers as privileged.8 If the conduct on which the
prosecution is based also gives rise to a civil action, a compromise or
offer of compromise of the civil claims is privileged if no agreement to
stifle the criminal prosecution is involved.
40
Where on the way to the police station the defendant pulled his auto-
mobile to the curb and said to the policeman "Listen, officer, can't we talk
this thing over?" and no innocent explanation of the inquiry was offered,
the effort to effect a settlement could be regarded as evidencing con-
sciousness of guilt.' 41
A federal statute once provided: "No pleading of a party, nor any
discovery or evidence obtained from a party or a witness by means of a
judicial proceeding in this or in any foreign country, shall be given in
evidence . . . in any court of the United States, in any criminal pro-
ceeding .... 142 Under this statute bankruptcy schedules were treated as
pleadings and therefore held not admissible.' But the statute was re-
136. Accardi v. United States, 15 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Morgan v. United Statcs,
169 Fed. 242, 251 (8th Cir. 1909).
137. United States v. Hunter, 26 Fed. Cas. 436 (No. 15424) (C.C.D.C. 1806).
138. Christian v. United States, 8 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1925). See Downey v. United
States, 263 F.2d 552, 553 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Picarelli, 148 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 722 (1945).
139. McCormick § 251, at 543. See 12 Texas L. Rev. 510 (1934).
140. Ecklund v. United States, 159 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1947).
141. United States v. Picarelli, 148 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 722 (1945).
The court cited 4 Wigmore § 1061, at 31. See also United States v. Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143,
161 (M.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952), where
the court rejected defendant's evidence as to the details of his rejected offer to compromise
his income tax liability.
142. Rev. Stat. § 860 (1875).
143. Cohen v. United States, 170 Fed. 715, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1909); Johnson v. United
States, 163 Fed. 30, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1908).
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pealed by act of May 7, 1910.11 Consequently bankruptcy schedules now
became admissible in evidence.14 5 However, a reclamation petition filed
by a third party was not admissible. 4  While the statute was in effect,
possibly it barred the use of a guilty plea, but after its repeal it did not. 41 '
A defendant is not entitled to offer in evidence an allegation in a prior
indictment. Judge Learned Hand held that an indictment is not a pleading,
and did not assume that even if it were, it would be competent as an ad-
mission.'48 Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that indictments and informations are pleadings. In some cases the
court may take judicial notice of the indictment. 14
Admissions of counsel in one suit or proceeding are not competent evi-
dence as admissions of his client to prejudice him in the trial of a different
issue in another action or proceeding. 50 On a prosecution for conspiracy
to use the mails to defraud, the arguments of the defendant's attorney
before a state insurance commissioner when opposing a rival's attempt
to do business there were not admitted.''
There may be admissions by conduct. A leading example is flight of
the defendant. 52 The flight of the defendant is a circumstance "proper
to be laid before the jury as having a tendency to prove his guilt." ' But
flight does not create a legal presumption of guilt. 5 4 Evidence of flight
144. 36 Stat. 352 (1910).
145. Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1913); United States v. Green, 220
Fed. 973, 974-75 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
146. Todd v. United States, 221 Fed. 205, 207-08 (8th Cir. 1915).
147. Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, 495 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 247 U.S. 522 (1918). See Annot., 1918E L.R.A. 87.
148. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590 (1928).
See Orfield, Pleadings and Motions Before Trial in Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 Fordham
L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (1960).
149. United States v. Krepper, 159 F.2d 958, 968 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
824 (1947); United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345, 346 (E.D. Mo. 1941). See Orfield,
Judicial Notice in Federal Criminal Procedure, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 503, 509-10 (1963).
150. Miller v. United States, 133 Fed. 337, 350 (8th Cir. 1904). But admissions in the
same case are binding. Jones v. United States, 72 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1934).
151. Miller v. United States, supra note 150, at 350.
152. McCormick § 248; 2 Wigmore § 276.
153. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896). See also Monnette v. United
States, 299 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646, 649 (10th
Cir. 1958); Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d 8, 11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 884
(1954); Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 US. 834
(1948) (citing I Wignore § 276); Kanner v. United States, 34 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir.
1929); Campbell v. United States, 221 Fed. 186, 190 (9th Cir. 1915); Stewart v. United
States, 211 Fed. 41, 45 (9th Cir. 1914).
154. Hickory v. United States, 160 US. 408, 422-23 (1896); Alberty v. United States,
162 U.S. 499, 509-11 (1896) ; Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 917 (1959); United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1956);
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is admissible in a prosecution for using the mails to defraud.'r It is not
confined to homicide cases. While a court has held that evidence of
flight is never admissible in cases where the proof of the crime consists
of direct evidence, 156 another court has denied this. 57 Where several
defendants are jointly prosecuted, the evidence of flight of one defendant
should be confined to him. 58 The probative effect of a flight depends
upon the conditions and motives which prompted it.159 Evidence is ad-
missible of an attempt to escape.10 A warrant of arrest need not have
been issued."'
A court 62 has quoted the view of Wigmore: "It is to-day universally
conceded that the fact of an accused's flight, escape from custody, re-
sistance to arrest ... and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself .... "" Concealment of
the results of the crime is admissible.'"
Personal falsification by the defendant in the course of the criminal
proceeding may operate as an implied admission against him.' It has
been so held as to contradictions, misstatements, and falsification of en-
tries. 66 The Government may introduce an affidavit setting forth three
witnesses desired by the defendant, but whom he did not call at the
trial. 67 On a second trial of the defendant it may be shown that he feigned
United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803, 872 (S.D. Ga. 1906), aff'd, 154 Fed. 401 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596 (1907) ; Betts v. United States, 132 Fed. 228, 233 (1st Cir. 1904).
155. Rowan v. United States, 277 Fed. 777, 779 (7th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S.
660 (1922) ; Betts v. United States, supra note 154, at 233-34.
156. Trapp v. New Mexico, 225 Fed. 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1915).
157. Rowan v. United States, 277 Fed. 777, 779 (7th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S.
660 (1922).
158. Braswell v. United States, 200 F.2d 597, 599 (5th Cir. 1952).
159. Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1954). See also Hickory v. United
States, 160 U.S. 408, 417 (1896).
160. United States v. Campisi, 248 F.2d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892
(1957).
161. United States v. Ayala, 307 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
162. Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
917 (1959). See also United States v. Ayala, supra note 161, citing McCormick § 248.
163. 2 Wigrnore § 276, at 111.
164. Rivers v. United States, 270 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
920 (1960).
165. See 2 Wigmore § 278, at 122.
166. United States v. Randall, 27 Fed. Cas. 696, 703 (No. 16118) (D. Ore. 1869). Sco
also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620 (1896) (false stories); Corey v. United
States, 305 F.2d 232, 239 n.20 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956 (1963); Holt
v. United States, 272 F.2d 272, 275-76 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Simone, 205 F.2d
480, 482 (2d Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Smolin, 182 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1950); Andrews
v. United States, 157 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821 (1947).
167. Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 165, 169 (1894).
insanity at his first trial.' A scheme to concoct a perjured alibi may be
shown.1
69
An attempt to bribe the arresting officer may be shown.'70 An attempt
to bribe a witness may be shown.' Forfeiture of a bond by failure to
appear may be shown; and the Government may show also that the de-
fendant by failing to appear forfeited bonds in other cases pending
against him.' 2 Fabrication of false testimony may be shown.' On a
prosecution for murder a letter forged by the defendant purporting to be
the confession of another was admitted. 4 "An attempt to fabricate evi-
dence is to be considered as evidence of guilt as to the main facts
charged. M7
5
If the defendant attempts to suppress or destroy evidence, this may be
shown . 6 But it is not alone conclusive evidence of guilt. 77 Mutilation
of books and disappearance of records may be shown.7 It may be shown
that the defendant persuaded a witness to make statements different from
his prior affidavit. 9 On a perjury prosecution it may be shown that the
defendant had attempted to persuade a witness to leave town. 80 The
defendant may show intimidation of witnesses by the Government.' 8
Where the defendant urges a government witness to refuse to testify
168. Waller v. United States, 179 Fed. 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1910), citing 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 278 (1st ed. 1904).
169. Harvey v. United States, 215 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
170. United States v. Picarelli, 148 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 722 (1945);
Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289, 294 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927);
Green v. United States, 289 Fed. 236, 239 (8th Cir. 1923); United States v. Kelly, 119
F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.D.C. 1954).
171. DiCarlo v. United State, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925); United States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D. Pa. 1948), afi'd, 173 F.2d 116
(3d Cir. 1949).
172. Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944).
173. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1896).
174. Harris v. United States, 169 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 872 (1948).
175. Stanley v. United States, 245 F.2d 427, 433 (6th Cir. 1957).
176. Wallace v. United States, 243 Fed. 300, 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 650
(1917), citing 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 278 (1st ed. 1904). See also United States v. Graham,
102 F.2d 436, 442 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939); DiCarlo v. United States,
6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); Le Mfore v. United States,
253 Fed. 887, 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 586 (1918).
177. Ayala v. United States, 268 Fed. 296, 299-300 (1st Cir. 1920).
178. Donegan v. United States, 296 Fed. 843, 848 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585
(1924).
179. United States v. Freundlich, 95 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1938).
180. United States v. Segal, 147 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 814 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
181. United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 907 (1952).
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because of self-incrimination, this may be shown to prove conscious
guilt.'82 It may be shown that the defendant assaulted a witness who be-
fore the trial announced his intention to tell the truth.18 3 Attempts to
suppress evidence may be shown. 4 Fabrication of false documents may
be shown.'85 Fabrication of a story may be shown. 8 Evidence of a de-
fendant's attempt to tamper with or impede a witness is admissible as an
act of admission.8
In 1893 the Supreme Court stated: "The rule even in criminal cases
is that if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses
whose testimony would elucidate the transactions, the fact that he does
not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would
be unfavorable." 8 8 The court did not state that the United States At-
torney could comment on such failure. If the witness would be incom-
petent, counsel may not comment. 9 An inference unfavorable to the
defendant cannot be drawn from the absence of witnesses who had no
relation to him in the case and were equally available to the Govern-
ment.' 90 The trial judge should not comment where neither side has sug-
gested absence of witnesses. Where the trial judge may comment he
182. Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289, 294 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554
(1927). See McCormick § 250.
183. Hass v. United States, 31 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 865 (1929).
184. United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 860
(1948); Hilliard v. United States, 121 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627
(1941); Seeman v. United States, 96 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620
(1938).
185. Harris v. United States, 169 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 872 (1948);
United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1947). '
186. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1896); Stanley v. United States, 245
F.2d 427, 433 (6th Cir. 1957); Andrews v. United States, 157 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821 (1947); Banning v. United States, 130 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Shama v. United States, 94 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 568 (1938); United States v. Holz, 103 F. Supp. 191, 197 (E.D. Ill.
1950), modified, 191 F.2d 569 (1951).
187. Segal v. United States, 246 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894
(1957); DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925); Wallace v. United States, 243 Fed. 300, 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 650
(1917), citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 278 (1st ed. 1904).
188. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893). See Grunberg v. United States,
145 Fed. 81, 89 (1st Cir. 1906) (inference from failure to call employees allowed); United
States v. Thompson, 27 F. Supp. 905, 906 (M.D. Pa. 1939); McCormick § 248, at 533;
Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Federal Cases, 26 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 30, 69
(1963).
189. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 747, 768 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 246 U.S. 662 (1918).
190. Egan v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Himmelfarb v. United
States, 175 F.2d 924, 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
should state the inference to be drawn, that the witness would be adverse.
Failure to present witnesses favorable to a party gives rise to the in-
ference that his testimony would be unfavorable to that party." 1 Unless
the witness is dead, the party should exercise due diligence to account
for a failure to call him. Since a party may comment on the absence of
an opposing party's witness, the opposing party may introduce evidence
excusing the absence, such as illness.192
Where the Government failed to call an informer as a witness against
the defendant, the Supreme Court stated that it must assume that the
informer's testimony "would not have been helpful in bringing guilty
knowledge home to [the defendant] .... ,,193
In a manslaughter prosecution when the Government subpoenaed sev-
eral witnesses but did not call them to testify although they were present,
the trial judge need not charge on request of the defendant that if the
jury found that a party had it peculiarly within his power to produce
witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that
he does not do so creates a presumption that the testimony if produced
would be unfavorable.' In i narcotics prosecution it was held that the
failure of the Government to call subpoenaed witnesses who could to
some extent have contradicted the defendant's testimony gave rise to an
inference that the testimony would have been against the Government."'
However, there is no absolute duty in all cases on the Government to call
all witnesses subpoenaed by it.'96
Comment of the trial judge to the jury that the defendant, relying on
alibi, did not call the party he was allegedly with to corroborate alibi
testimony, is not reversible error.0 7
The Government may excuse the failure to produce a material witness
191. McAbee v. United States, 294 F.2d 703, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 US.
865 (1962); Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); United States v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1958),
citing McCormick 533-34; United States v. D'Ercole, 225 F.2d 611, 614 (2d Cir. 19S5);
Samish v. United States, 223 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 848 (1955);
United States v. Walker Co., 152 F.2d 612, 613 (3d Cir. 1945).
192. Schumacher v. United States, 216 F.2d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 951 (1955).
193. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948). See also United States v. Jackson,
257 F.2d 41,43 (3d Cir. 1958).
194. McGuire v. United States, 171 F.2d 136, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
195. Wesson v. United States, 172 F.2d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 1949).
196. United States v. Wallace, 300 F.2d 525, 530 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 US. 923
(1962).
197. United States v. Lawrenson, 298 F.2d 880, 885 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 913
(1962).
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by showing he cannot be found0 8 or that he is ill."" There is also excuse
if the witness is not competent.200
Failure of the defendant to call his wife as a witness with reference to
a trip may warrant an inference against the defendant. 201 The Govern-
ment may comment on the failure of the defendant to call his wife where
she was willing to testify. 2 2
Ordinarily no inferences can be drawn from the failure to call a witness
whose testimony is privileged. But if there be a waiver of the privilege an
,inference can be drawn.203
Possibly there is a duty on the Government to call all available wit-
nesses, although its failure to do so is usually not held reversible error.0 4
At least it has been held that when a Government witness is called and
he admits that all the testimony he has given is untrue, the defendant
should not be deprived of a full right to cross-examine so as to obtain a
full disclosure of the interest and nature underlying the previous testi-
mony and so that the jury has all the facts. °0 A witness whose name is
on the back of an indictment should be called by the Government if he
is a material witness.206 But he need not be called otherwise. In a prosecu-
tion for second degree murder the Government need not call a witness
merely because his name is indorsed on the back of an indictment.07
The trial judge may refuse to direct the United States Attorney to call
such witness. No adverse presumption can be drawn against the Govern-
ment for failure to call at the trial all witnesses subpoenaed where there
is no indication that their testimony is more than cumulative.2 0 8 It is
198. Gentll v. United States, 22 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1927).
199. Schumacher v. United States, 216 F.2d 780, i87 (8th Cir. 1954).
200. In 1893 it was held that ; wife was incompetent for or against the defendant. There
could therefore be no comment by the United States Attorney on the defendant's failure
to call her. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 120 (1893) (one justice dissenting). But
since 1933 the wife has been competent to testify for the defendant.
201. United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
925 (1953).
202. Bisno v. United States, 299 F.2d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
952 (1962) ; Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 982 (Alaska 1961). But see Graves v. United
States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2243 (MeNaughton Rev. 1961);
Annot., 5 A.L.R. 2d 928 (1949).
203. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 926 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
824 (1956). The court cited 2 Wigmore § 286, at 167.
204. 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1234, 1235 (1949). But see United States v. Peterson, 24 F. Supp.
470 (E.D. Pa. 1938), 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 143; 60 Colum. L. Rev. 858, 865 (1960).
205. United States v. Bourjaiy, 167 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1948).
206. United States v. Dowden, 25 Fed. Cas. 905, 906 (No. 14990a) (C.C.D.C. 1832).
207. Williams v. United States, 20 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
208. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 638 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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only when it is shown that the testimony of an uncalled witness would
be superior to testimony already introduced by a witness who had been
called, that failure to call a witness would permit a jury to draw an in-
ference.20 9
There should be no absolute right to instructions on failure to produce
witnesses. 10 The Second Circuit by Learned Hand, in rejecting the de-
fendant's exception to the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury to
disregard the Government's argument based on the defendant's failure
to call witnesses, stated:
A judge is not required to intervene here any more than in any other issue of fact.
He must indeed, as he always must, keep the prosecution... within bounds... just
as he must keep passion out of the debate and hold the parties to the issues. But he is
not charged with correcting their non-sequiturs; the jury are to find these for them-
selves. So the judge in the case at bar was not required to correct the argument, that
the failure of the defendants to call the four witnesses was a ground for supposing that
they would swear against them. He might have done so, but he need not .... 211
The decisions supported this view.
It is frequently stated that if the witness is equally accessible to both
parties, no inference arises from the failure of either to call him.2 12 But
what is probably meant is that if it appears that the witness would be as
likely to favor one party as the other, there can be no inference. Where
the defendant did not call his employees, the Government may comment:
as there is likelihood of bias, the witness is not equally available.2 1 Even
if there appears to be equality of favor, either party should be permitted
to argue the inference against the other..2 14
329 U.S. 742 (1946). The court cited 2 Wigmore § 287. See also Morton v. United States,
147 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 US. 875 (1945).
209. United States v. Llamas, 280 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1960).
210. McCormick § 249, at 536.
211. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666
(1932). See also United States v. Llamas, 280 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1960), citing McCormick
§ 249, at 535-36.
212. McCormick § 249, at 534. See Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.
1961); McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
824 (1956), citing 2 Wigmore § 288; Billed v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1950) ; United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 639 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 742 (1946); Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Moyer
v. United States, 78 F.2d 624, 630 (9th Cir. 1935); Rostello v. United States, 36 F.2d 899,
901 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Egan v. United States, 287 Fed. 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
213. United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946). The court cited 2
Wigmore § 288. See also Samish v. United States, 223 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 848 (1955).
214. United States v. Llamas, 280 F.2d 392, 393 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Jackson, 257 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir. 1958), citing McCormick § 249, at 534; United States
v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946), citing 2 Wigmore § 288.
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Some cases talk in terms of "presumption."21 One court stated that
"if the witness is available to the accused and not to the Government and
is informed concerning facts material to the case, the presumption arises
from his unexplained absence that the accused had good reason for not
calling him; and this may properly be argued against him. 21 But per-
haps it should be phrased in terms of inference or permissive presump-
tion. 17
If a party-even the defendant-takes the stand but fails to give evi-
dence as to relevant matters within his knowledge, an adverse inference
may be invoked, and the judge may comment.218
The failure of a party, including the defendant, to produce books
which show the character of his business transactions, warrants an in-
ference that such evidence would be damaging.210
When it would be natural under the circumstances for a party to pro-
duce documents or other objects in his possession as evidence and he
fails to do so, his adversary may use this failure to invoke an adverse
inference.220 Counsel may not, however, comment on the failure to pro-
duce evidence which would be incompetent.221 It was held in one case
that it was error for the court to comment on the failure to produce cer-
tain letters which certain witnesses testified were written to him. This was
"in derogation of the Constitutional right of the accused to furnish no
evidence in aid of the prosecution. ,,22
A trial judge correctly denied the defendant an instruction that the
Government's failure to produce account books of a Government wit-
ness raised an inference that they would be unfavorable to the Govern-
ment's claim, where the Government had produced primary evidence on
the issue and the defendant did not demand that such account books be
produced.223
Several cases have held that a guilty plea could be received at the
preliminary examination, and then could be offered in evidence at the
215. Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. Kan.
City L. Rev. 30, 69 (1963).
216. Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
217. McCormick § 249, at 535.
218. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492 (1917). See McCormick § 249, at
533-34.
219. United States v. Flemming, 18 Fed. 907, 916 (ND. Ill. 1883).
220. United States v. Walker Co., 152 F.2d 612, 613 (3d Cir. 1945); Hamburg-American
Steam Packet Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 747, 767 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 662
(1918).
221. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. United States, supra note 220.
222. Hibbard v. United States, 172 Fed. 66, 71 (7th Cir. 1909).
223. Kowalchuk v. United States, 176 F.2d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 1949), citing 2 Wigmore
§ 291.
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trial. 24 In 1942 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
to the contrary on the ground of violation of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. -2 25 Historically this theory was unsound. 0
Rule 5(c) provides that the "defendant shall not be called to plead"
upon his preliminary examination. But at the trial it is proper for the
United States Commissioner to testify that the defendant stated that
he was guilty and pleaded guilty to the complaint as read to him where
the defendant's rights were outlined to him and where defendant's counsel
had previously tried to draw from a witness testimony that the defendant
had pleaded not guilty before the Commissioner. 7
In 1918 a court held that a guilty plea made at arraignment and later
withdrawn could not be used at the trial. 28 In 1926 a court of appeals,
in refusing to reverse, held that use of the withdrawn plea was "not
clearly improper.... ,. In 1927 the Supreme Court held that a plea of
guilty made at arraignment and later permitted to be withdrawn is not
admissible at the trial," ° for the reason that it would nullify the order of
the court allowing the plea to be withdrawn. Another case put the re-
jection on the ground that the same considerations of fairness which
induced the trial judge to allow the withdrawal operated to cause re-
jection of the evidence. -2 3 1
Where a confession and guilty plea was found to be coerced, even
cross-examination concerning them may be reversible error.12
An unaccepted plea of guilty has been held admissible." There is con-
trary state court authority.2 34 Wigmore has suggested that an unaccepted
224. United States v. Adelman, 107 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939); Heim v. United States,
47 App. D.C. 485, 488, cert. denied, 247 U.S. 522 (1918). See also Vogt v. United States,
156 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Cooper v. United States, 5 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1925) (per
curiam). See McCormick § 242, at 511; Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 489, 534-35 (1958).
225. Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 269, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1942), 42 Colum. L. Rev.
1358, 30 Geo. L.J. 791, 28 Iowa L. Rev. 136.
226. Morgan, The Law of Evidence-1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 523-25 (1946);
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 24-27 (1949).
227. White v. United States, 200 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
999 (1953).
228. Helm v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, 489, cert. denied, 247 U.S. 522 (1918)
(one judge dissenting).
229. Hodge v. United States, 13 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 1926).
230. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927). See McCormick § 242, at 511;
4 Wigmore § 1067; 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1186 (1953); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 326 (1962).
231. United States v. Adelman, 107 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939). Compare Wood
v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
232. Bayless v. United States, 150 F.2d 236, 238 (8th Cir. 1945).
233. Christian v. United States, 8 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1925).
234. State v. McGunn, 208 Minn. 349, 294 N.W. 208 (1940), 27 Va. L. Rev. 703 (1941).
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offer to plead guilty should be governed by the rules covering a with-
drawn plea of guilty.3 5 Possibly it should be governed by the discretion
of the court.3"
A guilty plea in another federal criminal case, when offered in evidence
against the defendant in the pending federal criminal prosecution, in
which the facts admitted in the plea are material, is regarded as extra-
judicial, and the defendant may show that he did not intend to enter the
plea recorded, or at the time did not know the nature of the charge."8
Admissions by reference to a third person are receivable in evidence.3 8
On a white slave prosecution "letters written at the direction of the ac-
cused" were admitted.3 9
Judge Friendly cited the language of Wigmore240 that failure to deny
the statements of others is admissible "only when no other explanation
is equally consistent with silence; and there is always another possible
explanation-namely, ignorance or dissent-unless the circumstances are
such that a dissent would in ordinary experience have been expressed if
the communication had not been correct.' 2 4 1 But the case was decidable
on other grounds.
Whether the statement was heard by the defendant has been held for
the jury to determine.242 In practice the Government bears the burden
of proof.2 43 If the defendant does not understand English, he need not
respond to a statement in English.244
In 1843 a court stated: "The more recent decisions look with great
disfavor to the implication as by admissions of a party accused of a
crime, because his participation is asserted in his presence by a third
person without being denied by him. 2 5 Where the defendant was under
arrest and in the charge of an officer in one room of his house, while an-
235. 4 Wigmore § 1061, at 31, § 1067, at 66.
236. 27 Va. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1941).
237. Accardi v. United States, 15 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1926). See Orfield, Pleas In
Federal Criminal Procedure, 35 Notre Dame Law. 1, 18 (1959).
238. 4 Wigmore § 1070.
239. Shama v. United States, 94 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 568 (1938).
240. 4 Wigmore § 1071, at 70.
241. United States v. Gross, 276 F.2d 816, 820-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831
(1960).
242. Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds,
373 U.S. 487 (1963) ; Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1958).
243. Arpan v. United States, supra note .242, citing 4 Wigmore § 1071, at 74. See also
Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785, 792 (8th Cir. 1909).
244. Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239, 246 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Kalos v. United States,
9 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1925).
245. United States v. Matthews, 26 Fed. Cas. 1205, 1207 (No. 15741b) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1843).
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other officer with defendant's wife searched the adjoining room, incrimi-
nating statements made by the wife were not admissible against the de-
fendant on the theory that he could have heard and did not deny them,
since even if he had heard, being under arrest, he might have felt that
he was not at liberty to speak.246 When the defendant is under arrest he
is said to be under duress. -2 47
The silence of a codefendant, although present at the time of a con-
versation between a police officer and the defendant as to an attempted
bribe under circumstances not requiring the codefendant to speak, was
not admissible. 48 The rule might be different if there were a charge and
proof of conspiracy at the time of the conversation.40 Silence is not
admissible where there is no motive for the defendant to answer, as is
often the case where the statement is addressed to a third person. °
Identification of the defendant made out of court is not admissible
merely because made in the defendant's presence." There must have
been some evidence of acquiescence by the defendant. "It is a common
error to suppose that everything said in the presence of a defendant is
ipso facto admissible against him." Where defendants under arrest were
taken before the United States Attorney for examination, and another
arrested with them had said that the defendants were the ones who main-
tained a place for selling liquor, and defendants did not deny the state-
ments, admission of evidence over objection regarding the statement
made in the defendant's presence was reversible error as the defendant
has a right to be silent.252 The Tenth Circuit followed this view in 1936.2 3
In 1943 the Second Circuit followed this view, and declined to pass on
whether or not there are exceptional situations in which the evidence is
admissible.28 4 In 1952 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its position.21 On the
facts the error was cured by instructions, although Judge Frank dissented.
246. Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1909).
247. Parilla v. United States, 280 Fed. 761, 765 (6th Cir. 1922).
248. United States v. Harris, 45 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1930).
249. Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785, 792 (8th Cir. 1909).
250. Miller v. United States, 21 F.2d 32, 35 (8th Cir. 1927) (liquor offense), cert. denied,
276 U.S. 621 (1928).
251. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1925), cerL denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1924) (opinion by Learned Hand). See 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182 (1961).
252. McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928). But if the evidence was
received without objection, it is not reversible error to refuse to strike it out. Price v. United
States, 5 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1925) (per curiam).
253. Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41, 43 (10th Cir. 1936).
254. United States v. Lo Biondo, 135 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1943). The court cited
Wigmore § 1072.
255. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
But compare United States v. Lanza, 85 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 1936).
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In 1955 the Fifth Circuit vehemently condemned the use of such evi-
dence.256
In 1956 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
evidence as to an accusatory statement and as to the defendant's failure
to deny the same is admissible only if the circumstances were such as to
warrant the inference that the defendant would naturally have contra-
dicted it. An officer's testimony as to accusatory statements made by an
accomplice of the defendant was hearsay. The mere fact that the de-
fendant failed to deny the accusation did not render the testimony of the
officer admissible where the defendant was under arrest at the time and
gave as his reason his desire first to consult his lawyer, and also went on
to say: "Do you think I would tell you something that would put me in
jail? 25 7
In 1958 the Eighth Circuit held a statement as to homicide inadmissible
because the Government failed to show that the circumstances called for a
denial by the defendant.25  Most federal courts have held that no in-
ference of assent can be drawn from the silence of the defendant when
he is under arrest at the time of the accusation."' In 1962 the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated: "False exculpatory explanations made to investigating of-
ficers by a defendant are to be distinguished from flat denials of
accusatory statements. If the accusation is simply denied, the accusatory
statement is inadmissible hearsay.260
There have been a number of decisions taking the opposite point of
view. As has been seen these cases represent a minority view. Where, at
the time a statement incriminating the defendant was made, no warrants
had been issued, and prohibition officers were merely inquiring and in-
vestigating, the defendant's failure to deny the statement had evidentiary
force as he was not under duress. 20' The fact that the defendant, when
arrested for possessing counterfeit money, made no explanation of the
manner in which he got the money nor any assertion of innocence, may
be considered by the jury as a circumstance against him.202 Evidence is
256. Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1955), 7 Baylor L. Rev. 447.
257. Kelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion),
36 Neb. L. Rev. 354. One judge dissented on the basis that an evasive answer had been
given, citing Snowden v. United States, 2 App. D.C. 89-93 (1893). See criticism by
Falknor, Evidence, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 512, 518-19 (1957). See also 40 Minn. L. Rev. 598, 601
(1956), as to the District of Columbia.
258. Arpan v. United States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1958), 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 320.
259. 40 Minn. L. Rev. 598, 599 (1956) ; Orfield, supra note 224, at 510-11.
260. Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232, 239 n.20 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 956 (1963). The court cited 4 Wigmore § 1072(5).
261. Parilla v. United States, 280 Fed. 761, 765 (6th Cir. 1922).
262. United States v. Kenneally, 26 Fed. Cas. 760 (No. 15522) (N.D. 111. 1870).
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admissible that the defendant was silent when a telegram indicating his
guilt was shown him.263 In 1895 the Supreme Court held admissible the
declarations of a codefendant against a defendant "because they appear
to have been made in his presence and under such circumstances as
would warrant the inference that he would naturally have contradicted
them if he did not assent to their truth.12 4 This case was followed in
1958 in the Third Circuit, the court referring to "adoptive admissions"
as justified under Rule 26.265 The defendant, an executor, had opened
the deceased's safe and taken out money in bundles which he said con-
tained $500 each. But another person present stated that each bundle
contained $5,000. The defendant was silent after such statement.
In 1897 the Supreme Court referred to the view of some state courts
of last resort as holding that where a person is accused of a crime under
circumstances calling for a denial, his silence is competent evidence tend-
ing to establish his guilt.266 But the court did not say that it necessarily
approved of this view. In 1926 the Eighth Circuit let in such evidence.267
In 1943 the same court repeated this view. 68 In 1935 the Ninth Circuit
let in such evidence. 69 In 1946 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia took the same view.-2 70 In 1954 a district judge of the District
of Columbia stated: "Where accusatory statements are made in defend-
ant's presence or hearing, his silence may make admissible both the
statements and his failure to deny them, whether occurring immediately
following commission of the crime. . . or in the presence of police officers
at the scene ... or at police headquarters .... Similarly, not only silence
but also an evasive answer or one unresponsive to the statement may be
the basis for an inference of acquiescence." 271 But the court held that in a
prosecution of two others for sodomy, one defendant's statements, on
reading his codefendant's confession, that he would tell his story to his
lawyer and had nothing to say, was not an admission of guilt; a new trial
263. United States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. 832, 834 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1890).
264. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 56 (1895). This was followed in
Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 (1933).
265. United States v. Alker, 255 F.2d 851, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817
(1958), citing 4 Wigraore §§ 1071-72.
266. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 563 (1897).
267. Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S.
743 (1927).
268. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 380-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 US. 788
(1943), citing 4 Wigmore § 1071.
269. Rocchia v. United States, 78 F.2d 966, 972 (9th Cir. 1935).
270. Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d 177, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 822 (1947). One judge dissenting stated that most federal courts held otherwise. 158
F.2d at 183 (dissenting opinion).
271. United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (D.D.C. 1954).
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was granted. Where a defendant made an admission to another person in
his codefendant's presence implicating the codefendant in a bank rob-
bery, such statement was admissible against the codefendant, as his
silence under the circumstances was an admission. 72
Where the response to the statement made in the hearing of the de-
fendant is a denial, the courts exclude the evidence. 273 The defendant
has not adopted the statement made.
In a prosecution for counterfeiting, the declaration of the defendant,
when he was apprehended, that he had never been at the house where he
was apprehended until that time may be given in evidence, to repel any
unfavorable conclusion which his silence might have warranted, but not
to prove the fact.2
74
The defendant's possession of a document made by a third person may
sometimes justify an inference of assent .to the statements contained
therein. 275 There are federal cases going both ways. In one case an un-
answered letter to the defendant from a victim of his fraud, found in
the defendant's possession, was excluded.7  Incriminating letters from
the defendant's wife to a third person are inadmissible where it is not
shown that he saw or knew of the letters. On a narcotics prosecution
an unsigned letter from a third person as to such drugs, found in the
defendant's possession, was excluded s.2 1 But on a prosecution for altering
a postal money order, a memorandum book taken from the possession of
the defendant was admitted as containing admissions by him, and also as
containing handwriting by him to be used for comparison. 70 On a prosecu-
tion for sending obscene matter in the mail, in which the package was
found in possession of a woman who had received it from the express
agent, the finding of a photograph of the defendant in the woman's purse
was held admissible to show concert with her.2
8 0
In 1901 the Second Circuit stated that "it has been uniformly held by
the courts that the failure to reply to a letter is not to be treated ... as
272. Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds,
373 U.S. 487 (1963), citing 4 Wigmore § 1071. See also Tucker v. United States, 279 F.2d
62, 64 (5th Cir. 1960).
273. Thompson v. United States, 227 F.2d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1955), citing 4 Wlgmore
§ 1071. See also United States v. Dellaro, 99 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1938); Amczaga v.
United States, 296 Fed. 915, 916 (5th Cir. 1924).
274. United States v. Craig, 25 Fed. Cas. 682, 683 (No. 14883) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827).
275. 4 Wigmore § 1073, at 90.
276. Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1901).
277. Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785, 794-97 (8th Cir. 1909).
278. Poy Coon Tom v. United States, 7 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1925).
279. Dean v. United States, 246 Fed. 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1917) (one judge dissenting).
280. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (opinion by Learned
Hand).
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an admission of the contents of the letter."28 1 But an unanswered tele-
gram to the defendant was held admissible if under all the circumstances
of the case the jury found that it called for an answer.ere Evidence is
admissible that the defendant tore up the letter, and told a witness to
tear up his copy20
The books of a partnership are receivable against a partner.2 8 On
principle the corporation account books should be receivable in the same
way. 5 The federal cases seem to look in that direction, although perhaps
they are explainable on their particular facts. On a prosecution for
fraudulent use of the mails, the two defendants were the only persons
interested in the finance company. The corporate books were admitted."
On a similar prosecution books of certain corporations were received
against certain defendants who completely dominated the corporations.2s
The court may charge that the account books must be shown to have been
kept or supervised by and known to the defendant.
The admissions of a codefendant are receivable against himself only. 8
Statements made by an agent within the scope of his authority are
admissible against the principal.28 9 To render admissible extrajudicial
statements of an alleged agent of the Government, it must be established
that he was an agent of the Government, that he was acting within the
281. Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1901). See also Sorenson v. United
States, 168 Fed. 785, 795 (8th Cir. 1909). See Cestaro, Admission by Silence of Written
Matter: A Comment on Evidence and Public Policy, 39 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 138, 154-S7
(1962).
282. United States v. Babcock, 24 Fed. Cas. 909, 911 (No. 14485) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876).
See also Rumble v. United States, 143 Fed. 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1906) (part of a larger
correspondence).
283. Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539, 555-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616
(1941).
284. Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 US. 703
(1937).
285. 4 Wig-more § 1074, at 105.
286. Osborne v. United States, 17 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 US. 751
(1927).
287. Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1935). See also Taylor v. United
States, 96 F.2d 16 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 596 (1938) ; Levey v. United States, 92
F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 639 (1938). Compare Beck v. United
States, 33 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1929).
288. Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853
(1948). See Orfield, Relief from Prejudicial Joinder in Federal Criminal Cases (pt. 1),
36 Notre Dame Law. 276, 299-302 (1961); id. (pt. 2) at 495, 503-07; 4 Wigmore § 1076,
at 116.
289. United States v. Miller, 246 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.. 905 (1957),
citing 4 Wigmore § 1078. See also Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F.2d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir.
1930); United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827).
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scope of his authority, and that the statements were made before the
termination of the agency.290 The alleged agent may testify upon the
stand to the fact of his agency.291 A special agent for the Government
who participated in a narcotics sale and is now being prosecuted cannot
bind the Government by his statement made some two months after his
participation had led to the arrest.292 The court may exclude a tape record-
ing of the conversation offered by the defendant.
Judge Albert B. Mars has stated:
The hearsay rule is likewise satisfied when a vicarious admission is made. The classic
examples are the admission made by an agent on behalf of his principal and of an
accomplice on behalf of his co-conspirators. The privity of interest is such as to
make the assertion of the one making it that of the principal or of his fellows.
However, if the agency is terminated or the conspiracy is over, there is no longer
any authority in the agent to act on behalf of his principal or of the accomplice to act
on behalf of his co-conspirators. This is a part of the substantive law of agency and
of conspiracy, rather than of the law of evidence.293
The Supreme Court has stated by Mr. Justice Black:
There are many logical and practical reasons that could be advanced against a special
evidentiary rule that permits out-of-court statements of one conspirator to be used
against another. But however cogent these reasons, it is firmly established that where
made in furtherance of the objectives of a going conspiracy, such statements are
admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. This prerequisite to admissibility, that
hearsay statements by some conspirators to be admissible against others must be made
in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, has been scrupulously observed by federal
courts.
20 4
One court has stated: "It is of course a rule, scrupulously observed
in the federal courts, that hearsay statements made outside the presence
of an alleged conspirator before the conspiracy is established, are not
admissible to incriminate him." 9
The Supreme Court stated:
Doubtless, in all cases of conspiracy, the act of one conspirator in the prosecution
of the enterprise is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all .... But only
290. Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1954). See McCormick § 244.
291. Shama v. United States, 94 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 568 (1938).
292. Escandar v. United States, 295 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1961).
293. Gambino v. United States, 108 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1939). See McCormick § 244,
at 521; 4 Wigmore § 1079.
294. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949). See Orfield, Relief from
Prejudicial Joinder in Federal Criminal Cases (pt. 1), 36 Notre Dame Law. 276, 301-02
(1961) ; id. (pt. 2) at 495, 503-05 (1961).
295. Briggs v. United States, 176 F.2d 317, 320 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 861
(1949).
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those acts and declarations are admissible under this rule, which are done and made
while the conspiracy is pending, and in furtherance of its object. - 9
Declarations of a confederate made after his arrest will not, except
in the most unusual cases, be in furtherance of a common plan so as to
be admissible against a codefendant. -97 When the conspiracy has ended,
logically the subsequent conduct of a conspirator cannot be in furtherance
of it.298 So, in many cases the question becomes whether the conspiracy
has ended. The life of the conspiracy will not be extended on any theory
of an implied agreement to conceal the crime.299 The rule against admis-
sion of extrajudicial admissions of a conspirator made after the termina-
tion of a conspiracy cannot be circumvented by leaving the issue of termi-
nation to the jury with an instruction to disregard the admission if the
jury found the conspiracy ended before the admission.0 °
Declarations of one coconspirator to another are not competent to
establish connections of a third person with the conspiracy.301 Independ-
ent evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
participation therein when the declarations were made, is a prerequisite
to the admissibility of declarations against the defendant.
The federal courts usually do not discriminate between declarations
offered as conduct constituting part of the conspiracy and declarations
offered as a vicarious admission of the facts declared. Even when offered
for the latter purpose, the same test is imposed; i.e., the declaration must
have been made while the conspiracy was continuing. 02 Statements made
by a conspirator after arrest by way of confession were held inadmis-
296. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 308-09 (1892). See United States v. Sapper-
stein, 312 F.2d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 1963).
297. United States v. Lonardo, 67 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1933). See also Mosley v. United
States, 285 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1960); Fiswick v. United States, 329 US. 211, 227 (1946);
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
298. 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 989 (1959); 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1112 (1956).
299. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). See also the helpful summary by
Judge Charles E. Clark in United States v. Hall, 178 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States
v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962), citing Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1162 (1954).
300. Yokely v. United States, 237 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1956).
301. Mayola v. United States, 71 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1934); Nibbelink v. United States,
66 F.2d 178, 179 (6th Cir. 1933); Minner v. United States, 57 F.2d 506, 511 (10th Cir.
1932); Kuhn v. United States, 26 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1928); Kelton v. United States, 294
Fed. 491, 495 (3d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 590 (1924); Pope v. United States, 289
Fed. 312, 315 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 703 (1923); Stager v. United States, 233
Fed. 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. McKee, 26 Fed. Cas. 1107, 1110 (No. 15686)
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876).
302. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953).
1964] HtEARSA Y
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sible.30 Furthermore, the declaration must have constituted a step in
furtherance of the venture. °4
While the existence of the conspiracy must be proved independently
to justify the admission of the declaration, the trial judge in his discretion
may vary the order of proof, and admit the declaration contingent upon
the later production of the preliminary proof. 0 5 A witness' testimony that
others had told him that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy is
hearsay and incompetent to link the defendant with the conspiracy. 00
Before the statements of an alleged coconspirator may be received in evi-
dence as an exception to the hearsay rule, there must be some competent
proof, aliunde, from which the jury could conclude that the speaker was
a member of the conspiracy.30 7
The record of the conviction of the principal on a plea of nolo con-
tendere is admissible on a trial of confederates who were jointly indicted
with him and tried on the theory that they are accessories, for the pur-
pose of establishing the conviction and prima facie guilt of the principal.80 8
The same effect would be given to a plea of guilty. The accessories may
introduce evidence that the principal was not guilty. Minutes of the clerk
showing a plea of guilty by the principal are admissible."' On the
prosecution of an accessory after the fact, the principal offense cannot be
proved by introduction of the judgment of conviction of the perpetrators
thereof."' 0 A statute making the record of the conviction of one person
of stealing given property conclusive evidence of the fact that property
had been stolen in the prosecution of the receiver, violates the defendant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.3 '
V. STIPULATIONS
The evidential admissions just considered should be carefully dis-
tinguished from judicial admissions. Professor McCormick points out:
303. Rimmer v. United States, 172 F.2d 954, 959 (5th Cir. 1949).
304. United States v. Goodman, 129 F.2d 1009, 1013 (2d Cir. 1942).
305. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1945).
306. Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814
(1962).
307. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735-38 (9th Cir. 1963); Dennis v. United
States, 302 F.2d 5, 10 (10th Cir. 1962); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942).
308. United States v. Hartwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 196, 201 (No. 15318) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
But see Pharr v. United States, 48 F.2d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Havener v. United States,
15 F.2d 503, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1926); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 59 (1899);
Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. Kan. City
L. Rev. 30, 40 (1963).
309. Colosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1952).
310. Barone v. United States, 205 F.2d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 1953).
311. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54 (1899).
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"Judicial admissions are not evidence at all, but are formal admissions
in the pleadings, or stipulations, oral or written, by a party or his counsel
which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing
wholly with the need for proof of the fact."3"
Stipulations of fact made by the Government and the defendant are
binding. In an immigration prosecution a stipulation as to negligence
was upheld. The Supreme Court stated that it knew "no rule of public
policy which will prevent the United States Attorney from stipulating
with the defendant in a case of this character as to the ultimate facts in
the controversy." '313 While the court is not bound by a stipulation of the
parties as to the legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts stipulated,
it is bound as to the specific facts recited and the ultimate facts.
In 1942 the Supreme Court seemed in effect to say that the proper
construction of a statute and errors of the Government are not proper
subjects of stipulation.314 A confession of error by the Government on
these subjects, while entitled to great weight, does not bind the Supreme
Court.
Where the defendant stipulates testimony which he later attacks as
prejudicial, and it is stricken and the jury is instructed to disregard it,
there is no reversible error.3
1 5
Where the Government was ready to show motion pictures and the
defendant only then stipulated the facts about to be portrayed, the trial
judge in his discretion could still use the motion pictures.31 There is
no obligation to stipulate merely on an allegation of the defendant that
the jury will be inflamed by proof of arrests on numerous occasions. 11
In general there is no obligation to stipulate, and a party may insist on
proving the facts of his case. Under Canon 15 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, the lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client."
312. McCormick § 239, at 504. See also Morgan, Maguire, and Weinstein, Cases on
Evidence 504-05 (4th ed. 1957); 4 Wigmore § 1058; 9 id. §§ 2588-2597; 48 Colum. L. Rev.
478 (1948) ; 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 374 (1947).
313. Hackfield & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 446 (1905), reversing 125 Fed. 596,
598 (9th Cir. 1903). See also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451 (1912); Gambill
v. United States, 276 F.2d 180, 181 (6th Cir. 1960). Compare a contrary ruling in a
forfeiture case, Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1947), 48 Colum. L. Rev.
478 (1948).
314. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942).
315. United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958).
316. Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824 (1958) ;
United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Rivers v. United
States, 270 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920 (1960).
317. Alire v. United States, 313 F.2d 31, 34 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 943
(1963).
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The Government can make no claim based on a stipulation that the
defendant had waived his presence in the courtroom, where the defendant
has not authorized such a stipulation. 818
An oral stipulation which is not clear will be construed against the
Government. 19 The implication is that a clear oral stipulation is binding.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides: "As far as pos-
sible, important agreements, affecting the rights of clients, should be
reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid performance of an
agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to writing as required by
rules of Court."
A trial judge has instructed as to stipulations: "When the attorneys
on both sides stipulate or agree as to the existence of a fact, the jury
must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as con-
clusively proved. 3 20 A stipulation in open court in a prosecution for
unlawful acquisition and possession of marihuana, as to the identity of
the suspected substance as marihuana, established proof of such fact
without the necessity of further evidence. "The use of stipulations in
criminal as well as civil matters has long been recognized as proper."M
21
Where an indictment alleged that the person whose life was jeopardized
by means of a revolver in an attempted mail robbery was an assistant
postmaster, and the defendant's trial counsel so stipulated during trial
in the defendant's presence, it could not be urged on appeal that there
was no such official, since the allegation that such person was an assistant
postmaster was surplusage, and since subsequent counsel could not re-
pudiate the stipulation. 2
A stipulation obviating the necessity of presence of Government wit-
nesses, made in the interests of time and economy, admitting that certain
foreign bonds were stolen but not admitting that the defendants knew
the bonds were stolen, is admissible in evidence.123 The proof was largely
expert and formal. Even in a murder case stipulations as to essential
matters made by defendant's counsel were allowed. 2 4 This did not violate
the right of confrontation. The parties may stipulate through counsel the
318. Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 472, 475-76 (1st Cir. 1960).
319. Lubin v. United States, 313 F.2d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
320. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906, 928 (S.D. Calif. 1952), aff'd sub
nom. Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955).
321. United States v. Rodriguez, 241 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
322. Jones v. United States, 72 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1934).
323. Sullivan v. United States, 7 F.2d 355, 356 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
648 (1926).
324. Fukunaga v. Territory of Hawaii, 33 F.2d 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 US.
593 (1929). The defendant wished to plead guilty, but the trial court entered a plea of
not guilty.
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exact position of a gambling ship.3 5 In a habeas corpus proceeding fol-
lowing court martial proceedings, it was held that the defendant waived
his right of confrontation of witnesses by a written stipulation signed
by him and his counsel agreeing to the use of written statements of wit-
nesses in lieu of their production in court. -0 Where a defendant, having
obtained a trial separate from that of his codefendants, stipulates with
the prosecution for submission of the case against him to the court upon
evidence introduced by prosecution and defense, including direct and
cross-examination, at a prior jury trial of his codefendants, some of whom
were acquitted, there is no violation of the right to confront the witnesses
against him 327
In a conspiracy to sell goods at over-ceiling prices there may be a bind-
ing stipulation that the maximum price was the price set forth in con-
tracts by the selling corporation. 328 A stipulation made during trial that a
particular roll of cloth was part of the cloth involved in the transaction
giving rise to the prosecution and that it was present in the courthouse
was equivalent to formal introduction of the roll of cloth in evidence.2-
The court also instructed as to the effect of such evidence. A stipulation
between the defendant and the Government in a prosecution under the
Gamblers' Occupational Tax Act is binding on both parties. 0 A stipula-
tion of facts as to housebreaking and larcenies may be used in a prosecu-
tion for aiding such offense.33 In one case a signature card was admitted
in evidence, with the stipulation that if the president of the bank were
called as a witness, he would testify that the signature on the card was
that of the defendant, signed by him in the officer's presence.un
VI. DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
In one case the Supreme Court stated:
But we are of opinion that the evidence put in by the government, on this question,
was not competent. It consisted of statements alleged to have been made by the
deceased, in his lifetime to le Flore, the witness, that he did not belong to the
Indian country, but had come from Arkansas. Such statements do not come within
any rule permitting hearsay evidence. The trial judge appears to have regarded the
325. United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D. Calif. 1935).
326. Burns v. Sanford, 77 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
327. Cruzado v. People of Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1954).
328. United States v. Monroe, 164 F.2d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
828 (1948).
329. Gormley v. United States, 167 F.2d 454, 458 (4th Cir. 1948).
330. United States v. Kahriger, 210 F.2d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 1954).
331. Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
332. United States v. Minker, 197 F. Supp. 295, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aftd, 312 F.2d
632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
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testimony as within the rule that declarations of deceased persons made against their
interest are admissible-that as a colored person adopted in the Choctaw Nation gets
benefits, rights and privileges, a declaration made by him against that interest would
be competent. It may be that in a controversy on behalf of a deceased Negro's
right, or that of his representatives, to participate in the property of the nation, such
admissions might be competent. But this case is not within any such rule. The object
of the evidence here was not to enforce any rights or claims of the deceased against the
Choctaw Nation, but was to sustain an allegation in the indictment, upon which the
jurisdiction of the United States court depended.e 3
In 1943 the Second Circuit stated in a dictum with respect to the right
of confrontation and declarations against interest, that "declarations
against interest . . . have long been recognized as admissible. 33 4
Before the declaration can come in, it must be shown that the witness
is unavailable. 35 But other cases involving declarations against penal
interest do not let this declaration in even if unavailability is shown."'
In a prosecution for keeping a public gaming house it was held that
the Government's objection against evidence of a declaration of another
person that he kept the house should be sustained.87 Even on a trial
for murder it was held that evidence will not be admitted that another
person confessed that he killed the deceased."' Such a confession is merely
hearsay.3 9 It may develop that such confession was made for a considera-
tion, and the confessor might deny his guilt at his own trial. In 1913 the
Supreme Court followed the majority American rule 40 that evidence that
a third person had confessed the crime is hearsay and so must be ex-
cluded. 4'
In a liquor prosecution the confession of a third person that he was the
333. Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 617 (1896). It is pointed out in 5 Wigmore
§ 1461, at 267 n.1 that in this case the subject was confused with that of admissions.
On declarations against interest see McCormick §§ 253-57; Morgan 251-59; 2 Jones
§§ 295-300; 5 Wigmore §§ 1455-77; Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against Interest,
5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952); 21 Minn. L. Rev. 181 (1937); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946).
334. United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943).
335. Smith v. United States, 106 F.2d 726, 727 (4th Cir. 1939). See McCormick § 257,
at 554; 5 Wigmore § 1456.
336. United States v. Mulholland, 50 Fed. 413, 416 (D. Ky. 1892), appeal dismissed, 149
U.S. 782 (1893); United States v. McMahon, 26 Fed. Cas. 1131 (No. 15699) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
337. United States v. Miller, 26 Fed. Cas. 1255 (No. 15773) (C.C.D.C. 1830). The same
rule was applied to larceny from the mails. United States v. Mulholland, 50 Fed. 413, 416
(D. Ky. 1892) (the declarant was deceased).
338. United States v. McMahon, 26 Fed. Cas. 1131 (No. 15699) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
339. United States v. Randall, 27 Fed. Cas. 696, 705 (No. 16118) (D. Ore. 1869).
340. McCormick § 227, at 462; id. § 229, at 473.
341. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 272 (1913).
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one who had committed the offense charged was excluded.342 In a prosecu-
tion for aiding and abetting a murder, evidence showing that another
than defendant's principal might have committed the offense is admissible,
if the circumstances clearly point to such other person.343 In 1958,
the Tenth Circuit took an enlightened view when it stated: "Assuming,
however, that the companion did make a voluntary confession or state-
ment to the narcotic agent exculpating or exonerating the accused, modem
and convincing authorities support its admissibility as a statement of a
fact against penal interest."34 But the defendant failed to show that the
statement, if made, was voluntary and against the penal interest of the
declarant. Rule 63 (10) of the Uniform Rules would let in such a declara-
tion even though the declarant was available.
In some cases the declarations are admitted, but not to exonerate the
defendant. In a prosecution for conspiracy to commit offenses against the
United States by helping to organize the Communist Party, the acts and
declarations of third parties were admitted for the purpose of showing
their relationships to the conspiracy, but not the relationship of any
other persons involved. Judge Mathes stated that:
admitting evidence of acts and declarations of a third person to prove his own
membership in a conspiracy permits such evidence to serve merely as proof of the
relationship of the third-party actor or declarant himself-and not the relationship
of any other person-to the conspiracy. Such acts and declarations thus lack the
self-serving character of those which would establish the declarant's relationship to
another person, and indeed possesses the trustworthy character of statements against
interest. 345
VII. DYIN DECLAIATONS
Dying declarations are an exception to the hearsay rule.3 41 In 1851 a
court stated:
342. Neal v. United States, 22 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1927). See also Smith v. United
States, 106 F.2d 726, 727 (4th Cir. 1939).
343. Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430, 437 (8th Cir. 1928). No such drcumstances
were found in this case.
344. Mason v. United States, 257 F.2d 359, 360 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831
(1958).
The court cited Model Code of Evidence, rule 509 (1942); 5 Wigmore § 1476, at 281;
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (dissenting opinion by Holmes, J.).
See also United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919
(1961) ; 7 St. Louis U.LJ. 335 (1963).
345. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 892, 902 (S.D. Calif. 1952), aif'd
sub nom. Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955) (citing 5 Wigmore §§ 1476-77),
rev'd on other grounds 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
346. On dying declarations see 2 Jones §§ 301-07; McCormick §§ 258-64; Morgan 259-65;
1 Wharton §§ 297-335; 5 Wigrnore §§ 1430-52; 2 Underhill 705-762; 46 Iowa L. Rev. 375
(1961); 39 J. Crim. L. 646 (1949).
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In a criminal case involving life itself we admit, as testimony, declarations made by
a person not under oath, and where the accused was not present. And why? From the
supposed necessity of the case, and because declarations made by a person under the
danger of impending death, are regarded as if made upon oath in a court of justice.
We confine this rule of evidence to cases of homicide.8 47
Dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as
against him. 48 The defendant is entitled to such protection. 819 Admission
of dying declarations does not infringe the right of the defendant to
confront the witnesses against him. °0 In 1943 the Second Circuit stated
by Judge Augustus Hand that "most important of all in criminal trials,
dying declarations, have long been recognized as admissible." ''
Dying declarations are admissible only in homicide cases.88 2 They are
not admissible in a prosecution for using the mails to defraud and for
conspiracy to use the mails to defraud.88 They are not admissible in
admiralty cases. 8 4
On the trial of a husband for murdering his wife, her dying declarations
are not excluded because of their relation as husband and wife.8 5
The dying declaration must be that of the victim of the homicide and
not that of a third person, even though such third person was at the
point of death and himself confessed to the crime. 80
The declaration should be limited to the transactions causing the
death.15 7
The repetition of a dying declaration made when hope of recovery has
been regained is not admissible.88
If the dying declaration is not made in extremis, it is not admissible. 8 '
347. United States v. Macomb, 26 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1134 (No. 15702) (C.C.D. I11. 1851).
See also Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897); United States v. Taylor, 28
Fed. Cas. 19 (No. 16436) (C.C.D.C. 1833).
348. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895); Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 151 (1892); United States v. Taylor, 28 Fed. Cas. 19 (No. 16436) (C.C.D.C.
1833). See 5 Wigmore § 1452.
349. McCormick § 261, at 558.
350. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47, 61 (1899).
351. United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943).
352. United States v. McGurk, 26 Fed. Cas. 1097 (No. 15680) (C.C.D.C. 1802).
353. Holt v. United States, 94 F.2d 90, 92 (10th Cir. 1937).
354. Gadsden v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D. Md. 1944). See 5 Wlgmore
§ 1432.
355. United States v. McGurk, 26 Fed. Cas. 1097 (No. 15680) (C.C.D.C. 1802).
356. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 253, 272 (1913) ; United States v. Mulhol-
land, 50 Fed. 413, 419 (D. Ky. 1892). See 5 Wigmore § 1433.
357. Freihage v. United States, 56 F.2d 127, 132 (9th Cir. 1932). See 5 Wigmore § 1434.
358. Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 555 (1896). See 5 Wigmore § 1439.
359. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892); United States v. Woods, 28
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The fact that the deceased had received extreme unction tends to show
that the deceased was in articulo mortis, and the defendant cannot
object to such evidence.360 Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Supreme
Court, has stated: "There must be 'a settled hopeless expectation' ...
that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken ...
with the consciousness of a swift and certain doom." 31 The deceased need
not have made a statement of settled hopeless expectation. "There is no
unyielding ritual of words to be spoken by the dying." 3 2 The mere use
of the words "if I die" in the declaration does not bar its admission. '
It is a question for the jury whether this language manifested doubt as
to impending death. Evidence of duration of life after the declaration was
made is one element to consider.30 4
A disbelief in a future state of rewards add penalties does not exclude
the declaration, but may be used to impeach it.3"'
The character of the dying declarations, their consistency with estab-
lished facts, and all the circumstances of the dying man should be con-
sidered by the jury in determining the weight of such declarations. " '
Extreme youth of the declarant may be a bar; the declaration may also
be discredited by proof of the character of the deceased, his making of
prior inconsistent statements, or his lack of belief in a future state of
rewards or punishments.3 67 The declarant must have had an opportunity
to know the facts, and should state facts, not opinion.0 8 The mere fact of
asking leading questions will not exclude the declarations.0 9
On principle the opinion rule should not apply to dying declarations."'
But many courts apply it. On a prosecution for murder of his wife, her
Fed. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 16760) (C.C.D.C. 1834); United States v. Schwartz, 213 F. Supp.
306, 312 (EJ). Pa. 1963); United States v. Schneider, 21 D.C. 381, 404 (1893) ("speedily");
United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 365, 383 (1892), writ of error dismissed, 145
U.S. 571 (1892).
360. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 695 (1897). See In re Orpen, 86 Fed. 760,
763 (C.C.N.D. Calif. 1898) (international extradition).
361. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933), 22 Geo. L.J. 622, 8 St. John's
L. Rev. 360, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 290 (criticizing). See McCormick § 259, at 555; 5 Wigmore
§ 1440-42.
362. 290 US. at 100.
363. Freihage v. United States, 56 F.2d 127, 131 (9th Cir. 1932).
364. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
365. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897). See 5 Wigmore § 1443.
366. United States v. Gleason, 25 Fed. Cas. 1335 (No. 15216) (C.C.D. Iowa 1867).
367. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897).
368. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
369. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
370. 5 Wigmore § 1447. See Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 905 (1963).
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dying declaration that the defendant "poisoned me" was excluded. 871
An expression of opinion favorable to the defendant has been admitted.
The declaration that the defendant would not have struck the deceased
if the latter had not provoked him was admitted. 72
The declaration is not inadmissible because it was made under oath.,7"
If a part of the declaration only is proved, the opponent may prove the
remainder.3 74 If there are several dying declarations the jury should
give consideration to any inconsistency between them.87 ,
Upon request of the defendant the trial judge must give appropriate
instructions as to the status of dying declarations. 7
VIII. SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS
A. Declarations of Bodily Condition
Statements of external circumstances causing the injury are not ad-
missible as declarations of bodily condition. 77 On a prosecution for wife-
murder, the wife's statement during illness that her husband "has poisoned
me" was not admissible. 37 8
B. Declarations of Mental State
An exception to the hearsay rule admits statements or declarations
of a presently existing mental state of the declarant.17 But the courts
do not extend this exception to admit a declaration that the declarant
remembers or believes a certain matter as evidence that the matter so
remembered or believed is true. Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the
Supreme Court has stated: "Declarations of intention, casting light upon
the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory,
371. Shepard v. United States, 62 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1933). See also United States
v. Veitch, 28 Fed. Cas. 367 (No. 16614) (C.C.D.C. 1803).
372. United States v. Taylor, 28 Fed. Cas. 19 (No. 16436) (C.C.D.C. 1833).
373. Freihage v. United States, 56 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1932); In re Orpen, 86 Fed. 760
(C.C.N.D. Calif. 1898).
374. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). See 5 Wigmore § 1448.
375. United States v. Gleason, 25 Fed. Cas. 1335 (No. 15216) (C.C.D. Iowa 1867).
376. Freihage v. United States, 56 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1932) ; Armstrong v. United States,
41 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1930). See 49 Colum. L. Rev. 274 (1949); 32 Neb. L. Rev. 461 (1953).
377. 6 Wigmore § 1722.
378. Shepard v. United States, 62 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1933). On declarations of bodily
condition see 2 Jones § 324; McCormick §§ 255-67; Morgan, 285-89; 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence §§ 290-94 (12th ed. 1955); 6 Wigmore §§ 1718-23; Slough, Spontaneous Statements
and State of Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224-30 (1961).
379. See McCormick § 268. On declarations of mental state, see 2 Jones § 325;
McCormick §§ 268, 272; Morgan 289-96; 1 Wharton § 289; 1 Wigmore §§ 110-11, 140;
2 id. § 247; 6 id. §§ 1714-15, 1725-40; Slough, supra note 378, at 230-40.
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pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to
the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored."3 '
Testimony that at luncheon the corporate employer's president in-
formed his son, who was secretary and treasurer, that the president had
agreed to send money to the union business agent who had requested it
was admissible in a prosecution against the agent for illegally receiving
money from the employer, as a declaration of the president's intention.
Judge Friendly stated:
Shepard v. United States, 1933, 290 U.S. 96, 103-106 . . . does not hold that a
declaration of design is rendered inadmissible because it embodies a statement why
the design was conceived. In that case there was no relevant declaration of design;
the statement, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me," was wholly of past fact and was offered
and received as a dying declaration, erroneously as the Supreme Court held.asl
A writer has pointed out that the issue as to state of mind may some-
times be whether the defendant's acts caused the state of mind.3" The
declarations will often describe inseparably the acts and their effect on the
mind of the declarant. In such case the normal practice is to admit the
declaration and instruct the jury to consider it only in proof of the
declarant's mental state, and to disregard it as evidence of the offending
conduct. For example, in a prosecution for conspiracy in restraint
of interstate trade in poultry, declarations of receivers as to why
they refused to sell to recalcitrant marketmen were held admissible
to show the state of mind of the declarants, but not to show the external
facts declared as reasons."' The defendants would have been entitled
to instruction to that effect if requested. But all this will be hard for the
jury to understand. If the mental state can be proved by other evidence,
and the danger of prejudice to the defendant is great, the judge in his
discretion might well exclude the declaration." 4
There has been a reluctance in American criminal cases to accept the
threats of a third person to commit the act with which the defendant is
charged as evidence that the crime was committed by the third person
380. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-106 (1933). See Criticism of this case in
6 Wigmore § 1725 n.1. See also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 209-13 (1948).
381. United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919
(1961).
382. McCormick 99 269.
383. Greater New York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 47 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1931). Accord, American Coop. Serum Assn. v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d
907 (7th Cir. 1946). See 6 Wigmore § 1792; Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 63(12)(a)
(1953).
384. See McCormick §§ 59, 269.
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and not by the defendant. 8 5 While some cases exclude such threats
altogether, the better practice is to admit them when the trial judge in
his discretion finds that there is sufficient accompanying evidence of
motive, overt acts, opportunity or like confirming circumstances to give
substantial significance to the threats.8
In homicide and assault cases when the defendant claims self-defense,
threats of the victim known to the defendant are provable to show his
apprehension of danger and the reasonableness thereof. 87 For these
purposes they have no element of hearsay.
Uncommunicated threats, that is to say threats not known to the
defendant, are received to show the intention, and hence to ground the
first act of aggression in the altercation with the defendant.888 A threat
to do harm to the defendant's father or near relative is sufficient. 8,
In one case the defendant was convicted of a murder committed during
a card game. The defendant testified that the deceased attacked him
first, but all the other witnesses swore that the defendant was the ag-
gressor. After the trial there was newly discovered evidence that an open
pen knife was found in the pocket of the deceased, but not in his hand. On
appeal it was held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. 0
When a defendant claims self-defense and there is substantial evidence,
though it be his own testimony, that the deceased attacked him, evidence
of uncommunicated threats of the deceased against the defendant
is admissible, though there are eye-witnesses. The case seems to be the
first in which a concealed weapon has been classified as an uncom-
municated threat. But nonverbal threats may tend to explain an act by
the deceased or to corroborate other evidence of aggression by the de-
385. McCormick § 270 (1954); 1 Wigmore § 140.
386. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891). As the Court reversed on another
ground, it found it unnecessary to determine whether there was reversible error In ruling
out such testimony. See also Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1961).
387. Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466 (1896); Allison v. United States, 160 U.S.
203 (1895). See McCormick § 270, at 573; 2 Wigmore § 247; 6 id. § 1732.
388. Allison v. United States, supra note 387, at 215; Wiggins v. Territory of Utah, 93
U.S. 465 (1876) (one justice dissenting); Trapp v. Territory of New Mexico, 225 Fed.
968 (8th Cir. 1915). See 1 Wigmore § 110.
389. Trapp v. Territory of New Mexico, supra note 388, at 969.
390. Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704 (1949); Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d
990 (D.C. Cir. 1950), 39 Geo. LJ. 150 (1950), 41 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 337 (1950),
49 Mich. L. Rev. 1234 (1951), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 315 (1951), 31 Ore. L. Rev. 81 (1951),
18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1951), 14 U. Detroit L.J. 36 (1950), 12 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 446 (1951),
4 Vand. L. Rev. 356 (1951). See 1 Wigniore § 111, cited by the Court in 336 U.S. at 709.
See also Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (allowing evidence of the
deceased's character and belligerence although unknown to the defendant).
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ceased. The Government knew of the evidence at the first trial, but failed
to disclose it to the defendant.
In 1892 in a civil case39' the Supreme Court held that declarations of
intention are receivable to show later acts. A possible implication was that
declarations of memory and belief to show the truth of the facts believed
are also receivable. But in 1933 the Supreme Court denied this. It declined
to admit, in a case of murder of a wife by poisoning, the declaration of
the wife while suffering from the poison, "[My husband] has poisoned
me," offered to rebut the defense of suicide. It was not possible ef-
fectively to limit the evidence to proving her state of mind."0 2 A leading
writer has pointed out that subsequent decisions of American and English
courts reveal an inclination to admit declarations of deceased persons
about previous happenings where justice requires it.393
C. Excited Utterances
As early as 1869, in a civil case in which the deceased described his
alleged injury shortly after its occurrence, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Swayne, stated:
The res gestae are the statements of the cause made by the assured almost con-
temporaneously with its occurence, and those relating to the consequences made while
the latter subsisted and were in progress .... Rightly guarded in its practical ap-
plication, there is no principle in the law of evidence more safe in its results.... In
the ordinary concerns of life, no one would doubt the truth of these declarations, or
hesitate to regard them, uncontradicted, as conclusive. Their probative force would not
be questioned.3 94
The Court cited, favorably, a Massachusetts case395 on manslaughter
where the deceased's statement that the defendant had stabbed her was
391. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilimon, 145 US. 285 (1892). This was followed in a
federal criminal case, Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 817 (1957), as to making false noncommunist affidavits.
392. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104-06 (1933), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 175
(1934), 25 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 119 (1934), 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 651 (1934) (critical),
9 Wis. L. Rev. 196 (1934). See Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American
System of Litigation 154-62 (1956); 6 Wigmore § 1725, at 81 n.1 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan,
supra note 380, at 212-18.
393. McCormick § 271.
394. Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 408 (1869) (two Justices dissenting).
See also United States v. King, 34 Fed. 302, 314 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1888). On excited utterances,
see generally 2 Jones §§ 320-22 (5th ed. 1958); McCormick § 272; 2 Morgan 269-99 (1954);
1 Wharton §§ 280-82; 6 Wigmore §§ 1745-64; Hutchins & Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclama-
tions, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 432 (1928); Slough, supra note 378, at 240-48; 36 Iowa L. Rev. 703
(1951); 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 419 (1947); Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1938).
395. Commonwealth v. McPike, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 181 (1849), cited in Insurance Co.
v. Mosley, supra note 394, at 406.
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held properly admitted, and thought the latter case involved the same
principle as the case before it. On a homicide prosecution in the District
of Columbia a declaration of the deceased immediately after he was
stabbed, "I've been struck," was admitted.396 On a murder prosecution the
statement of the victim, seriously injured, on regaining consciousness was
admitted. 97
On a robbery prosecution the trial judge may submit testimony of
officers who arrived at the scene of the alleged offense after hearing pistol
shots that they heard the victim yelling, "You robbed me; you robbed
me" to the defendant who was found at the place. 98 Where the wife
of a deputy marshal was with him when he attempted to serve process
and was assaulted by the defendant, and the wife ran next door to use the
telephone, telling residents next door that her husband was being as-
saulted with a butcher knife, such remarks were part of the res gestae
and admissible. 99
Where the excited utterance occurs three hours after the startling
event, the utterance was held properly excluded."' Assault on a child was
involved. Another testified what the child victim said, the child being
excluded as a witness. On a prosecution after rape of a child five and a half
years old, her statement made to her grandmother, more than an hour
later, was admitted. The grandmother testified. As to cases of abuse of
female children "the principle of what is called the res gestae has been,
from necessity of the case, extended beyond the limits that obtain gen-
erally in civil cases."'4 ' Where an indecent act was unattended by physical
injury, the statement of the six-year-old girl to her mother shortly after
leaving the defendant's taxicab was admitted." 2 But in 1956, the same
court held that in-the absence of injury to the child, the statement of the
child to the mother was not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. 03
Such evidence is no more convincing than a confession. The problems of
396. United States v. Edmonds, 63 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1946), citing (at 972) 6
Wigmore § 1747. See also Grant v. United States, 28 App. D.C. 169 (1906).
397. Lampe v. United States, 229 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
398. McQueen v. United States, 262 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
399. Pietrzak v. United States, 188 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951).
400. Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court cited (at 139)
6 Wigmore §§ 1747, 1750, 1754, 1761. See also Smith v. United States, 215 F.2d 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
401. Snowden v. United States, 2 App. D.C. 89 (1893). See also Smith v. United States,
312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (telephone call by rape victim immediately after attack);
Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954)
(statement made one hour later).
402. Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
403. Jones v. United States, 231 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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hearsay and double hearsay may arise, and bar the spontaneous state-
ment.
404
The spontaneous statement of the defendant is admissible in his
favor. 5 In one case the court so held, stating that it probably strained the
law in admitting statements of the defendant on the way to the guardhouse
or after arrival there.4 0 6
The spontaneous statement of the victim is admissible..40  So are
spontaneous statements of third persons. 40°
A wife's statement may be used against her husband in a murder
prosecution where she was the victim. 40 9 Spontaneous statements can be
used against a defendant as most of the cases here discussed show.
A statement by a victim of violence may be spontaneous even though
it is in answer to a question. It was held proper to admit the testimony
of a police officer that the victim had said that the defendant "did it,"
even eleven hours after an assault on her and several days before her
death.410 It should be noted that in cases such as these, employment of
the spontaneous declaration exception circumvents the limitations of the
dying declaration exception.
A letter of explanation sent by the defendant to the collector of internal
revenue after indictment for income tax evasion is not admissible as a
spontaneous declaration. 411 A "declaration, to be admissible as part of
the res gestae, must have been a spontaneous utterance of the mind while
under the influence of the transaction. 4
D. Declarations of Present Sense Impressions
A statement made in immediate response to an external stimulus which
produced no shock or nervous excitement whatever may be highly trust-
worthy. The guarantee of trustworthiness is the contemporaneousness.
No criminal cases have been found applying this proposed exception,
404. Pinkard v. United States, 240 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
405. Stroud v. United States, 2 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1924) (defendant's spontaneous state-
ment of innocence at time of arrest admitted).
406. United States v. King, 34 Fed. 302 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1888).
407. United States v. Edwords, 63 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1946).
408. Pietrzak v. United States, 188 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 824 (1951);
Barnard v. United States, 162 Fed. 618 (9th Cir. 1908) ; United States v. Schneider, 21 D.C.
381 (1893).
409. United States v. Schneider, supra note 408.
410. Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also Lampe v. United
States, 229 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956); 54 Aich. L. Rev. 133 (1955).
411. Barshop v. United States, 191 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920
(1952).
412. Busch v. United States, 52 F.2d 79, 88 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.. 687
(1932).
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but there are federal civil cases applying it. In a personal injury action
pertaining to a fatal accident at a railroad crossing, a question of fact was
presented as to whether or not the crossing signals were given, the bell
rang, or whether any signal of the approach of the train was given. A wit-
ness was asked to state whether his wife had made any remarks as to the
signals. In answer to this question he testified that his wife stated: "Why
don't the train whistle?" This calm though spontaneous declaration was
admitted as a part of the res gestae.418 In 1962, a court stated that among
the "distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule encompassed by the term res
gestae" are "declarations of the present sense impression." 414 Rule 63 (4)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence admits a statement which the judge
finds was made "while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition
which the statement narrates, describes or explains."
E. Res Gestae
In a prosecution under the slave-trade act against the owner of a ship,
testimony of the declarations of the master, being part of the res gestae,
connected with acts in furtherance of the voyage and within the scope of
his authority as agent of the owner, in the conduct of the guilty enter-
prise, is admissible against the owner.415 The Court declined to give an
opinion whether mere declarations, under other circumstances, would have
been admissible.
In 1829, Justice Washington stated: "For we hold the law to be, that
where two or more persons are associated together for the same illegal
purpose, any act or declaration of one of the parties, in reference to the
common object, and forming a part of the res gestae, may be given in
evidence against the others. '416 In a case in which the defendants were
jointly charged with the murder of the deceased, the acts, appearances
413. Emens v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 223 Fed. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915). On this exception see
McCormick § 273; 2 Morgan, 296-99. 6 Wigmore § 1757; Morgan, A Suggested Classification
of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 236-39 (1922) ; Slough, supra note
378, at 248-53; Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 430 (1946); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 15 (1946); Annot.,
140 A.L.R. 874 (1942).
414. Wabisky v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 309 F.2d 317, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Gesswine, 144 Fed. 56 (6th Cir. 1906) (statement as to speed of
train as it was going by).
415. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). See 6 Wigmore § 1769.
On res gestae see generally 2 Jones §§ 318-33; McCormick § 274; 2 Morgan 284-300;
1 Underhill §§ 265-66; 1 Wharton §§ 279-84; 6 Wigmore §§ 1745, 1757, 1767-69; Morgan,
Res Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 91 (1937); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances
Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922); Slough, Res Gestae, 2 Kan. L. Rev. 41,
121, 246 (1953); Annot., 163 A..R. 15-235 (1946).
416. American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 364-65 (1829). See also
Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (2d Cir. 1919).
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and declarations of each as to how the homicide occurred were admitted
as a part of the res gestae.41 7 Each person against whom evidence was
offered was present at the time the unlawful acts were committed and
the declarations were made.
In a ruling in favor of the defendant, a court held that anything that
is said and done by the defendant and the prosecuting witness at the
time of the larceny was directly connected with the transaction and ad-
missible.4 1 Such evidence may be used to explain the motives and intent
of the defendant and to impeach the credibility of the prosecuting witness.
Declarations of the defendant accompanying and explaining the res
gestae may be proved, but such declarations are not admissible as part of
the res gestae unless they in some way elucidate or tend to characterize
the acts which they accompany, or may derive a degree of credit from
the fact itself. If the declaration depends entirely for its effect on the
credit of the person making it, it is inadmissible."'
What the defendant said or did at a date subsequent to the offense is
not admissible as it is not a part of the res gestae." ° The defendant can-
not thus make himself a witness, nor use his unsworn statements to ex-
culpate himself.
In general, acts and statements of a third person, not shown to have
been an agent of the defendant, are inadmissible, even though they do not
violate the hearsay rule, unless they are part of the res gestae of the
transaction, or are acts of a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy,
or are the declarations of the victim of rape to the first person to whom
she talks.4'
In a trial for assaulting the persons in charge of a mail car and robbing
them of mail, testimony that defendants also robbed them of their
personal possessions is not inadmissible because such act was a state
offense, but was competent as a part of the res gestae.42
Conversation which was a part of the res gestae is admissible.42
Cases in which the utterances are contemporaneous with a nonverbal
417. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 149 (1894). See also Harrison v. United
States, 200 Fed. 662 (6th Cir. 1912); Keliher v. United States, 193 Fed. 8 (1st Cir. 1912);
Sprinkle v. United States, 150 Fed. 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1906) (dissenting opinion).
418. Turner v. United States, 24 Fed. Cas. 375 (No. 14262a) (C.C.D.C. 1860).
419. United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 34 (C.C.D.N.H. 1881).
420. United States v. Imsand, 26 Fed. Cas. 465 (No. 15439) (C.C.S.D. Jla. 1869).
421. McWhorter v. United States, 281 Fed. 119 (6th Cir. 1922). As to complaint of rape,
see 6 Wigmore §§ 1760-61.
422. Dixon v. United States, 7 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925).
423. United States v. McCartney, 264 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 845
(1959); United States v. Tuffanelli, 131 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1942); United States v. Sebo,
101 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1939).
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act, independently admissible, relating to that act and throwing some
light upon it are an exception to the hearsay rule.42 4
In 1944 Judge Learned Hand, in cutting short the argument of govern-
ment counsel that certain out-of-court statements were not admissible
because not a part of the res gestae, stated that "it is a phrase which has
been accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any
place whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an un-
willingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible
terms. 4 25 A court stated, in a 1962 civil case that: "There are at
least four distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule encompassed by
the term res gestae: (1) declarations of bodily present condition;
(2) declarations of present mental state and emotion; (3) excited
utterances; (4) declarations of the present sense impression. 420
F. Self-Serving Declarations
According to the earlier cases self-serving declarations of the defendant
ordinarily are not admissible.427 A defendant's declaration, in a liquor
prosecution to the sheriff's wife, that he did not want liquor on his
premises, but desired to have the sheriff come and get it, is inadmissible.4 28
Where a woman was prosecuted for falsely claiming that she was a
widow and thus entitled to a veteran's pension, it was proper to exclude
evidence that she had denied publicly entering into any new marriage, as
it was self-serving and no part of the res gestaea20
The expression of plan, by the defendant, not to do the thing charged
is admissible. 30 A defendant was arrested at a compromising place. His
declaration made beforehand that he was going to the place to obtain bail
for his brother-in-law was admitted.43' On an income tax prosecution, a
letter containing written instructions for the preparation of the return was
424. United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919
(1961), citing (at 377) McCormick § 274, at 586-87 and Morgan, A Suggested Classification
of Utterances Available as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 236 (1922). Accord, Wilson v. United
States, 313 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1963).
425. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944). See McCormick § 274,
at 587; 6 Wigrmore § 1767. But see Annot., 163 A.L.R. 15 (1946).
426. Wabisky v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 309 F.2d 317, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See
McCormick § 274, at 586.
427. Nielson v. United States, 24 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1928); Anderson v. United States,
152 Fed. 87 (9th Cir. 1907). On self-serving declarations see generally McCormick § 275
(1954); 6 Wigmore § 1732; Comment, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1306 (1963); Note, 40 Minn. L.
Rev. 844 (1956) ; Note, 22 Minn. L . Rev. 391, 402 (1938).
428. Herman v. United States, 48 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1931).
429. Lane v. United States, 142 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944) (one judge dissenting).
430. 6 Wigmnore § 1732.
431. United States v. Craig, 25 Fed. Cas. 682 (No. 14883) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827).
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held admissible.43 2 The defendant sent forms signed in blank to an ac-
countant giving instructions for him to file a return which they would
correct when he returned to his office. The letter was admissible as
bearing on his intent. But on a prosecution for violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, declarations and conduct negativing misconduct were
excluded.433
Statements of intent or motive by the defendant at the time of the act
charged should be admissible.4 34 But in one case, this view was not fol-
lowed completely. On a prosecution for fraudulent entries under the
homestead laws by false representations to entrymen, true representations
to other entrymen were excluded.4 35 However, four years later, the same
court held that a letter of one defendant to another was admissible to
show good faith. Prosecution was for use of the mails to defraud. 3
In a prosecution for obtaining and disposing of goods in violation of the
bankruptcy law, the statements of a defendant charged with absconding,
made on his way from the place of his residence, as to his intentions of
returning, are competent evidence to disprove the charge."3 ,
With respect to a type of spontaneous declaration, namely the
declarant's declaration of his present state of mind, a federal court has
adhered to the view that the self-serving character of a declaration is not
of itself a ground of exclusion. On a prosecution for misapplication of
money of a bank, the defendant's declaration to the president of the bank
showing a want of intention to defraud should have been admitted. "What
else but 'self-serving' the testimony of an accused person on his direct
examination is likely to be, we find it difficult to understand . . . ."I" On
a prosecution for conspiracy it is reversible error to exclude, as self-
serving, testimony by the defendant and witnesses in his behalf as to
432. White v. United States, 216 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1954). citing (at 6) 6 Wigmore § 1732.
See Wolcher v. United States, 218 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Falknor, Evidence, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 927, 933 (1955); Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 844, 848 (1956).
433. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 120 (6th Cir. 1944), aft'd, 328
U.S. 781 (1945).
434. See 6 Wigmore § 1732, at 102. See also id. § 1772.
435. Huntington v. United States, 175 Fed. 950 (8th Cir. 1909) (one judge dissenting),
citing (at 956-57) 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1732 (Ist ed. 1907).
436. Gould v. United States, 209 Fed. 730 (8th Cir. 1913).
437. United States v. Penn, 27 Fed. Cas. 490 (No. 16025) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1876).
438. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) (opinion by Learned
Hand) (hearsay not involved). The case was followed in United States v. Bucur, 194 F.2d
297 (7th Cir. 1952). See also Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 57 Harv. L. Rev.
481, 568 (1946). See generally 6 Wigmore § 1732; Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presump-
tions in Federal Criminal Cases, 26 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 30, 35 (1963); Note, 40 Minn.
L. Rev. 844, 851-52 (1956).
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declarations made by the defendant indicating a good faith severance
from the conspiracy on learning of its illegal character. 480
The self-serving declaration rule does not apply in an income tax
prosecution where the issue involved the terms of an alleged contract
between the taxpayer and an employee. Their conversations "fixed" the
terms of the employment, hence were admitted. 440 A letter by the
defendant to the collector of internal revenue explaning his income tax
return was regarded as self-serving.44' But the trial court permitted the
defendant to testify as to the facts stated in the letter.
Wigmore has pointed out that statements of political opinion should be
admitted in favor of the defendant on trials for sedition and treason.442
But on a prosecution for attempting to cause insubordination in military
forces in the United States the defendant's offer to show utterances at
a prior time "in favor of the war with Germany" were held inadmissible
because irrelevant.443
Where a confession is received in evidence, the defendant is entitled to
have all those parts which are exculpatory and in his favor come in, on
the principle of completeness.444
On principle, the statements of a defendant made before or upon ac-
cusation and before a motive for deliberate contrivance could have
operated should be receivable, whether or not he becomes a witness.448
But on a prosecution for murder, denials when arrested were excluded. 440
However, in a subsequent case, the defendant's spontaneous statement
of innocence made at the time of the arrest was received.447
IX. RECoRDS OF PAST RECOLLECTION
The Third Circuit has stated in a scholarly opinion by Judge Kalodner:
Professor Wigmore separated, broadly, what he called "past recollection recorded"
from "present recollection revived," attributing much of the confusion in the cases
to a failure to make this distinction and to the use of the phrase "refreshing rec-
ollection" for both classes of testimony. The primary difference between the two
439. United States v. Bucur, supra note 438, at 301.
440. Paddock v. United States, 79 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1935).
441. Barshop v. United States, 191 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920
(1952).
442. See 6 Wigmore § 1732.
443. United States v. Krafft, 249 Fed. 919 (3d Cir. 1918). In Wells v. United States,
257 Fed. 605 (9th Cir. 1919), utterances by other than the defendant were involved. Hence,
the case is not in point on the present issue.
444. United States v. Long, 30 Fed. 678 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1887).
445. See 4 Wigmore § 1144; 6 id. § 1732.
446. United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. 365, 376 (1892), writ of error dismissed, 145 U.S.
571 (1892).
447. Stroud v. United States, 2 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1924).
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classifications is the ability of the witness to testify from present knowledge: where
the witness' memory is revived, and he presently recollects the facts and swears to
them, he is obviously in a different position from the witness who cannot directly state
the facts from present memory and who must ask the court to accept a writing for
the truth of its contents because he is willing to swear, for one reason or another, that
its contents are true.448
In 1957, a court stated:
Courts have long recognized the propriety of a witness adopting a recollection re-
corded in the past where his, once existing, recollection has vanished. The chief
difficulty precluding the use of past recorded recollections has been the need to "insure
the accuracy and identity of the record," i.e., that the memorandum or document
reflects the witness' past recollection . . . . To this end the courts have formulated
rules designed to guarantee that the recorded knowledge was clearly and accurately
remembered by the witness when the record was made or verified. . . . If these
requirements of reliability are met, the nature of the record as well as the mode of
its preparation should be immaterial. 449
The use of a judicial transcript of a former trial of the same case,
recorded by an official court reporter at a time when the events to which
the witness testified were fresh in his mind, satisfied the tests of reliability
necessary to allow a witness to adopt a recollection recorded in the past,
where his once existing recollection had vanished.5 0 Notes of an unofficial
stenographer of bankruptcy proceedings have been held admissible."'
Where postal inspectors themselves testified as to inspections made
immediately after post office burglaries, use of their contemporaneous
notes of the inspections presented no hearsay problem.5 - It was un-
necessary to consider whether the notes would be admissible under the
business records statute.53
There are cases in the New York courts and federal civil cases which
appear to hold that loss of testimonial memory must be shown."' In a
448. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949); 1950 Wash. U.L.Q. 146. On records of past recollection see generally 4 Jones §§ 972-
74; McCormick §§ 276-80; 2 Underhill § 500; 3 Wharton §§ 850-54; 3 Wigmore §§ 734-55;
Maguire & Quick, Testimony: Memory and Memoranda, 3 How. L.J. 1 (1957); Morgan,
The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1927); Note,
28 Iowa L. Rev. 530 (1943); Comment, 3 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 616 (1956); Annot., 125 A.L.R.
19 (1940).
449. Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
943 (1958).
450. Id. at 131, citing 3 Wigmore § 734. Annot., 125 A.L.R. 246 (1940).
451. Wattenmaker v. United States, 34 F2d 741 (3d Cir. 1929).
452. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 921 n.10 (2d Cir. 1961), citing 3 Wigmore
§ 737(2).
453. See McCormick § 280; Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
276, 278-82 (1961) ; Note, 28 Iowa L. Rev. 530, 536-38 (1943).
454. See McCormick § 277; 3 Wigmore § 738.
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federal criminal case the court stated: "In the instance of past recollection
recorded, the witness, by hypothesis, has no present recollection of the
matter contained in the writing."45 5 But later on the court stated: "Of
course, the categories, present recollection revived and past recollection
recorded, are clearest in their extremes, but they are, in practice, con-
verging rather than parallel lines; the difference is frequently one of
degree. ' '4
56
A court has stated: "The difference between present recollection
revived and past recollection recorded has a demonstrable effect upon the
method of proof." '457 The recollection must have been fairly recent when
recorded. The witness must state that the matter was recorded truthfully.
The original must be produced if possible.
As to records of past recollection the witness must have had first-
hand knowledge of the facts. 58 Thus, the record is not admissible where
the witness testified to information not known to him, contained in a
memorandum of another.459 The memorandum must have been made
"while the occurrences mentioned in it were recent, and fresh in his
recollection."4 0° The recording in 1948 of something happening in 1943
is not sufficiently fresh to be accurate. Moreover, the statement must be
properly verified by the witness. He must testify that at the time he made
the written statement he then knew it to be true.
The witness need not himself be the writer, so long as he can speak
of the facts from his own recollection.40' One decision held that the
memorandum must be made by the witness or under his direction.40 2
The original record itself must be used in testifying if it can be
procured.463 If the record is in the hands of the defendant it is not
455. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949).
456. Id. at 889.
457. Id. at 887, citing 3 Wigmore §§ 744-55. See generally Maguire & Quick, supra note
448, at 3-5, 15-20; Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 616, 626-27 (1956). On refreshing recollec-
tion, see Orfield, Examination of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 4 Ariz. L. Rev, 215,
229-33 (1963).
458. Grunberg v. United States, 145 Fed. 81 (1st Cir. 1906). See 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 747.
459. United States v. Keppler, 1 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1924).
460. Wolcher v. United States, 200 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
822 (1955). The court (at 496) cited Maxwell's Ex'rs v. Wilkinson, 113 U.S. 656 (1885):
3 Wigmore § 745. Wigmore's test is that the events were "fairly fresh." This test is favored
by McCormick § 277. See Maguire & Quick, supra note 448, at 5 n.12.
461. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949); Rumely v. United States, 293 Fed. 532, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 713
(1923). See 3 Wigmore § 748.
462. Delaney v. United States, 77 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1935).
463. See 3 Wigmore § 749.
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procurable. Hence, a bookkeeper's memorandum of total sums represented
in a document given to the defendant is admissible."' On a prosecution
for burglary of a freight car, the train auditor's record, made up from
temporary memoranda, was admitted." 5 A transcript of stenographic
notes was held admissible when the original notes were lost.4 r" A memo-
randum of conversations overheard is admissible. The memorandum may
be copied from another. In a liquor prosecution the witness' note book
was required to be produced. 0 7 In a prosecution for conspiracy to violate
liquor laws, it is proper to admit an authenticated copy of the original
list of automobile license dealers observed by the witness to be coming
and going from a garage, where the original list was unavailable.?
On a prosecution for embezzlement certain corporate records were
admitted on the testimony of all participants, each to his share. 0
Should the record be produced where the witness is testifying? A
court has stated: "Perhaps a more orderly judicial procedure in this
situation would recommend that the witness produce and use the transcript
while testifying. 4 70 But this may be excused when the record is available
to the opponent (here the defendant) as a public record, such as a
transcript of a former trial. In an earlier case the court stated: "The
general rule is that, when a record is used . . .opposing counsel may
demand inspection of it, and, if it exhibits erasures, alterations, or other
irregularities, the jury's attention may be called to them.""" Only the
parts of the record relating to the subject of his testimony may be
inspected.4 7 1
According to one approach, the verified and adopted record, on
principle, becomes a present evidentiary statement of the party offering
it473 In one case, the federal court confused the subject by ignoring the
two kinds of memoranda.474 In a subsequent case the "court received
464. O'Brien v. United States, 27 App. D.C. 263, 271-73 (1906).
465. Caudle v. United States, 278 Fed. 710 (8th Cir. 1921).
466. Rumely v. United States, 293 Fed. 532, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 US. 713
(1923).
467. Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926), citing (at 956) 2 Wigmore,
Evidence § 749 (2d ed. 1923).
468. Papalia v. United States, 243 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1957).
469. McNeil v. United States, 85 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See McCormick §§ 279-80;
3 Wigmore § 751.
470. Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
943 (1958).
471. Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926).
472. Browniow v. United States, 8 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1925).
473. See 3 Wigmore § 754.
474. Grunberg v. United States, 145 Fed. 81 (1st Cir. 1906).
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in evidence" a dictograph operator's notes.475 On a prosecution for con-
spiracy to violate liquor laws, a list of cars observed by the witness
coming to and from a garage was admitted "as a part of the testimony of
this witness. 476 On the other hand, McCormick suggests that admitting
the memorandum as an exception to the hearsay rule is "the more realistic
classification. 477
Courts have considerable discretion in applying the foregoing rules.
A court has stated: "Keeping in mind that the rules governing the use of
past recorded recollection were developed 'to secure the best available
memory of the witness, while guarding against imposition by false use
of purporting memoranda,' we are not willing to say that the trial
judge abused his discretion in admitting this testimony.1 47 8
475. Schoborg v. United States, 264 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1920). The court (at 9) cited I
Wigmore, Evidence § 754 (1st ed. 1915).
476. Papalia v. United States, 243 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1957), citing McCormick § 278
(1954), and 3 Wigmore § 754.
477. See McCormick § 278. See generally Maguire & Quick, supra note 448, at 22;
Morgan, supra note 448, at 718-19.
478. Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
943 (1958).
